Overseas Chinese in Java and Their Liquidation in 1740

A. R. T. Kemasang*

I Pre-colonial Days

Available evidence suggests that the Indonesian ruling class, in particular of Java, knew how to take care of its well-being vis-à-vis the potential competition of the "bourgeoisie" rather better than its feudal counterparts in Europe. To begin, the rulers themselves took up trading.\(^1\) They also deliberately excluded other social classes from this activity. Historians continually quote one Javanese prince's remark that

...if the natives had more than the necessaries of life, they would use the surplus [gained from trading] to do some harm to their rulers [Day 1904: 123fn. 2].

It was to prevent the rise of the indigenous bourgeoisie that Indonesia's trading aristocrats in general preferred to use the overseas Chinese. This was because the latter were manipulable; due mainly to their almost total lack of "clout." Unlike the other two equally long established foreign groups (the Arabs and Indians), the Chinese had nothing in the way of ideology or religion whereby they could proselytize the indigenous ruling circles. As a result, in Indonesia the Chinese never became associated with the representatives of state power but in the business realm. As they in effect existed outside the protection of the local institutionalized customs and obligations, the Chinese had always been "marginal" in all other respects; hence, suitable to be made use of and discarded at will with little chance of causing repercussions dangerous to the interests of the ruling class. It was because of these reasons that in pre-colonial Indonesia many key posts, such as that of the shahbandar (harbour master), were traditionally farmed out to the Chinese.\(^2\)

But even in the sole realm of trading, there was no question of the Chinese acquiring any influence beyond that tolerated by the local rulers. To preempt the Chinese from becoming economically powerful, the traditional Chinese containment methods included the custom that when a Chinese died all his worldly possessions went to his local (i.e., indigenous) sire. Hence, although some Chinese occupied apparently high posts,

Yet the fact that the Chinese were afraid that upon their death their goods

---

\(^{1}\) V., i.a., Van Leur [1967: 66 et passim].

\(^{2}\) V., i.a., De Haan [1912: iii/436], Glamann [1958: 75], Meilink-Roelofsz [1962: 286], Schrieke [1966: i/28], s. also, for markets, Moertono [1968: 90].
would revert to the king shows how insecure their social position was [Meilink-Roelofsz 1962: 247]. If this for any reason proved insufficient, the ruling class would resort to the more direct use of force. In the 1620s, when the Chinese traders of Banten—forced by the Dutch—were moving their business to the emergent Dutch trading centre Batavia, the Bantenese ruler not only confiscated the properties of the Chinese but also enforced capital punishment against their owners. One Sim Suan, said in most sources to be extremely rich and therefore “influential,” was simply and unceremoniously

...taken prisoner by the authorities in Bantam and put in irons. His house, in which the United Company (VOC) was storing a large parcel of goods, was seized, and his wife and children were also deprived of their liberty. To be sure, he was released again after a couple of months, but from that time on his position was very precarious [ibid.: 251].

Anakoda Wating, a trader in rice and proprietor of arak distilling enterprises (who became a witness at the signing of the 1614 contract between the VOC and the ruler of Jakarta) fared even worse. For trading with the Dutch he was executed by the Bantenese ruler.3) That all this in the event failed to prevent the exodus of the Chinese to Batavia is, of course, another matter altogether.

It is to be noted, however, that in common with other pre-capitalist societies, in Indonesia at the time there was no conscious or concerted effort to keep the Chinese alienated. Resident Chinese were free to adopt the Indonesian cultural attributes of or marry into the local indigenous society and, thus, became “Indonesian.” And once they did this the former-Chinese were treated by the local rulers no differently from the latter’s indigenous subjects. In other words, the Chinese were made use of in the ways as outlined only as long as they preferred to be so treated (by maintaining their “Chinese” attributes and ways that distinguished them from the indigenes).

Which explains the widespread absorption of the Chinese by the indigenous society, that took place at the highest stratum of the local (indigenous) society as well as the lowest. Amongst the former, Puteri Ong Tien of the Court of Ceribon (West Java) and Raden Patah, founder-ruler of Java’s first Muslim kingdom Demak [Campbell 1915: i/77-78; De Graaf & Pigeaud 1974: 37, 139; Penanggung 1972: 19, 26, 28; Raffles 1830: ii/125, 127; Tempo 1977: 30], are two cases in point.

II Colonial Spice Trading Era

The comprador tradition of the Chinese in the Indonesian economy suited the Dutch well. Precisely because they were not part of the local (rural) institutions, the Chinese were highly mobile as well as vulnerable: a quality most suitable for compradorship in a society whose most

3) V., i.a., De Jonge [1869: iv/270], Hoetink [1917: 348].
dominant economic sector (VOC) was promoting monopoly. As the nature of trading in this period (due to the fact that its most important commodity, spices, grew "wild") was accumulative/distributive, only the comprador type of service was in demand. All this explains why Dutch policy makers virtually outdid each other in praising the "diligence," "law-abidingness" and other laudable qualities of the Chinese. Similarly making a virtue out of necessity, the most famous Governor General (GG) of this period (Jan Coen) is continually quoted as having proclaimed that there were no other people on earth better than the Chinese and that there were never enough of them for the Dutch colony.

The Dutch strategy, in meeting the demand for Chinese labour, was two-faced. In areas where the Chinese position was established, the basic strategy from the early days of the VOC was to buy into the Chinese network. So deceptive was this strategy that, e.g., in relation to sugar manufacturing, even scholars of today are duped into accepting at face value the colonial claim that the Chinese "dominated" this industry until the 19th century. A more careful look reveals that the Dutch method of advancing capital to Chinese manufacturers made complete nonsense of this claim. It is to be noted, to begin with, that before the demand for sugar was created by the Dutch the amount produced by the resident Chinese was so small that when the VOC afterwards purchased sugar on a regular basis it at first had to buy from other countries. Then, for quite some time, whatever was subsequently available from Indonesia had to be supplemented by what was bought from China, Siam, Taiwan and other places. It was only owing to the capital injected by the Dutch that the production of Java sugar eventually became commercially significant.

As a commercial undertaking sugar from the 1700s was well on its way to becoming a decidedly Dutch preserve. It was a "putting out" industry wherein the Dutch supplied the capital and land whereas the role of the Chinese was limited to supplying the labour. It goes without saying that even in this limited role some Chinese managed to invest themselves. It goes equally without saying that their position (as client-capitalist) was definitely subservient to that of the Dutch financiers; who, in addition to controlling the capital in quantities that mattered, had the sole exercise over the most effective tools of coercion. This situation was reflected, e.g., by the fact that the industry was only commercially significant in areas under the direct rule of the VOC. This was why, until 1740, the industry was concentrated particularly in Batavia's environs; although West Java's soil as a whole was the least suitable for sugar

4) V., i.a., Colenbrander [1919: 243], Mei­
link-Roeofs [1962: 250, 251, 259], Coolhaas [1953: 966].
5) V., i.a., Tio [1923: 5], Gimbrère [1928: 10, 11].
6) V. also Geerligs [1911: 118].
7) V. also Levert [1934: 55].
8) V. also Tio [1923: 1, 2], Gimbrère [1928: 5–6].

125
cane.\(^9\)

In this arrangement, arrogating the double function of gamekeeper and poacher,\(^{10}\) the Dutch were able to fleece the Chinese in multifarious ways. E.g., the VOC

...maintained a monopoly of the sugar trade that enabled it any time to break the prices it paid to the producers [Day 1904: 70].

This accounts for the great disparity between the price the VOC paid the Chinese producers and the selling price; in c. 1710 they were 1 1/6 stuiver and 13 à 14 stuivers respectively.\(^{11}\) Before being able to produce their sugar, the Chinese of course must rent the land. Here too they were evidently preyed upon not only by the corporate VOC but also by its individual servants.\(^{12}\) In 1752, e.g., GG Mossel sublet the land he rented from an indigenous ruler at 100 Rds/year to a Chinese sugar producer for 1,000 Rds/year.\(^{13}\) It was undoubtedly via machinations such as this that Mossel became “the biggest sugar manufacturer of his time” [De Haan 1912: iv/548]. Finally, the Chinese could only sell their sugar to, or through, the Dutch;\(^{14}\) the Dutch alone decided the price.\(^{15}\)

In places where the Chinese position had not taken root, the Dutch simply bludgeoned in; using the Chinese merely as their “semi servile”\(^{16}\) labourers. This was the case in Batavia, which the Dutch built on the ruins of Jakatra after they razed it in 1619. Here, in acquiring their Chinese, the Dutch used all means fair and foul. GG Coen is on record as having forced visiting Chinese to settle in Batavia,\(^{17}\) and sending ships on kidnap missions to the southern coasts of China and many other Southeast Asian emporia for able-bodied Chinese.\(^{18}\)

Apart from kidnapping abroad, the Dutch also preyed upon the Chinese who had resided in other parts of Java itself.\(^{19}\)

Although in establishment literature this question is virtually ignored, Batavia’s great demand for Chinese subsequently occasioned a brisk trade in Chinese slaves.\(^{20}\) This was known as, i.a., the “hog trade.”\(^{21}\)

\(^9\) V. also Tio [1923: 2].
\(^{10}\) After Boxer [1979: 76].
\(^{11}\) V., i.a., De Jonge [1875: viii/XXXX], Molsbergen [1939: 43-44], Tio [1923: 10].
\(^{12}\) V. also Burger [1975: i/56].
\(^{13}\) V. De Haan [1912: iii/785].
\(^{14}\) V. also Burger [1975: i/57].
\(^{15}\) V. also Tio [1923: 10], Gimbrère [1928: 12].
\(^{16}\) After Ogg [1977: 81].
\(^{17}\) V., i.a., De Jonge [1869: i/CXV], Colenbrander [1919: i/475; 1920: ii/566; 1921: iii/517], De Haan [1922: i/74-75], Vleming [1926: 4], Cator [1936: 10], Ong [1943: 58], Meilink-Roelofsz [1962: 254].
\(^{19}\) V., i.a., MacLeod [1927: i/237], De Graaf [1958: 39], Vermeulen [1938: 6-7], Coolhaas [1952: 659], Meilink-Roelofsz [1962: 291].
\(^{20}\) V., i.a., Botenkoe [1929: 112-113], Chen [1967: 161].
\(^{21}\) V. Chen [1967: 161].
III 18th Century Colonial Economic Shift

As the 18th century dawned, the decline in the spice trade accelerated. This was caused by a combination of factors, including the saturation of the European market because too many Europeans were involved in this trade, and an actual drop in the demand for spices.

On the first count, acute competition between various European powers meant that “Profits from the spice trade dropped, squeezed by ... increasing costs of defending monopolistic control against rival nations” [Magdoff 1978: 102]. On the second, the drop in demand was brought about, i.a., by the discovery of cattle’s “winter fodder,” which rendered obsolete the use of spices to season meat. As a commodity, spices were increasingly being replaced by the “three new drinks, stimulants and tonics: coffee, tea and chocolate” [Braudel 1977: 178]. By 1720-30 tea consumption in Western Europe became “considerable” [ibid.: 180].

The 18th century saw the phenomenal growth of the tea and coffee trades, these stimulants becoming (economically) more important ... while the relative value of pepper, and spices declined still further [Boxer 1973: 223].

Technological advances that were changing the pattern of European trade, too, made themselves felt in Indonesia by way of a change in the requirement for raw materials. In Java this shift was reflected in the willingness of the Dutch to pay more for tobacco, cotton yarns and indigo. Another feature of this great economic change is shown by the fact that the Dutch turned the most fertile region of West Java into a huge plantation (Priangan); the better to meet the world demand for these cash crops.

The Chinese Became Redundant

Many of the crops now in demand were however not native to Indonesia. And crop transplantation entailed new socioeconomic conditions which only indigenous labour and resources could sustain. Coffee is one case in point. At every harvest, its transport alone required hundreds, even thousands, of draught animals and the use and construction of an evidently complex systems of canals and rivers in West Java.

In the case of native/established products, such as cotton and indigo, the method of their production had to be altered drastically to make their yields remunerative. The changes in production, in turn, required the massive recruitment of a rural labour force; which, again, could only be supplied by the indigenous sector of the populace. As the colonial archivist De Haan, with specific

22) V. also Ogg [1977: 81].
23) V. also Caldwell [1977: 62].
24) V. also Glamann [1958: 13, 14-15, 183], Furnivall [1944: esp. 42].
25) V. Realia [1882: i/222; 1885: ii/1, 134].
26) V., i.a., Raffles [1830: i/142], De Haan [1910: i/165; 1912: iii/644].
27) V. esp. De Haan [1912: iii/649ff].
regard to cotton, puts it:

...indeed, only by winning the trust of the (indigenous) Regents can as many cotton yarns as possible be obtained... [De Haan 1910: i/90].

All this necessitated the existence of a settled and readily available rural labour reserve.28) And for this the Dutch needed the collaboration of the indigenous (agrarian) ruling class.29) The need for the indigenous Indonesians’ collaboration became crucial particularly as the VOC, consistent with its monopoly policies, came to rely on forced deliveries.30) One important reason for this was because only people bound by customs and obligations resulting from landed stakes could be coerced to cultivate little known crops and forced to deliver the products at prices fixed by the buyer (i.e., the Dutch). As one Dutch “Commissar” for Native Affairs put it late in the 18th century:

...no native could be made to cultivate coffee, unless he possesses a significant number of rice fields... [ibid.: i/371; 1912: iv/463].

It is obvious that, for the same reasons that had made them mobile as compradors, the Chinese could scarcely be pinned down here. In the altered economy of colonial Indonesia, the Chinese had become the wrong type of labourers. The requirement for a different type of labour meant that from then onwards the Dutch had no structural need for the Chinese. This situation was epitomized by the fact that when the VOC decided to cultivate coffee in Java, young plants were distributed to indigenous rulers31); not to Chinese contractors as presumably the case would have been earlier. Likewise, it was an indigenous ruler (of Ceribon)—and not a Chinese—who in 1706 was made supervisor of the coffee plantations in Priangan.32) In indigo, too, the Dutch now made use of the indigenous regents’ services.33) In his letter of 25 November 1708, GG Van Hoorn mentioned that the cultivation of indigo in Batavia’s hinterlands, such as Krawang, was put under the “reign” of the Javans.34)

In cotton production, the story was the same. One of the first Dutchmen to realize the importance of cotton in Java (Tack) advised in a letter of 30 November 1685 for the use of Javans in the cultivation and spinning of cotton in Batavia’s environs.35) In 1693, in response to the spiralling demand in Europe, Batavia sent a committee—comprising two former followers of Banten’s Pangeran Purbaya and two Dutch militarymen—to urge West Java’s regents from Cianjur to Nusakambangan to deliver all available cotton to Batavia. The reason for the

28) V. also De Haan [1910: i/116].
29) V. also De Haan [1910: i/99].
30) For the latter, v., i.a., De Jonge [1870: v/CXXXIV], Levert [1934: esp. 54], Molsbergen [1939: 44].
31) V., i.a., De Jonge [1870: v/CXXXVI], De Haan [1910: i/119; 1912: iii/494], Molsbergen [1939: 45], Glamann [1958: 207].
32) V., i.a., Van der Chijs [1886: iii/566], De Haan [1910: i/101, 220].
33) V., i.a., De Haan [1910: i/91; 1912: iii/391–393], Realia [1885: ii/1].
34) V. De Jonge [1870: v/154].
35) V. De Haan [1912: iii/384].
inclusion of the two indigenous dignitaries was for “tact” and because “only by winning the trust of the Regents” could the products in demand be obtained.\textsuperscript{36}) This committee was followed by numerous others. As a rule, the composition of their membership was “half white, half brown” [De Haan 1910: i/91]. We can say with Van Klaveren, although he was then referring to coffee:

Only the moral authority of the (indigenous) regents, could induce the population to start work [Van Klaveren 1953: 60].

Indeed, even for 200 bundles (i.e., as opposed to large deliveries on a regular basis) of cooking tamarind the Dutch now went to the indigenous princes\textsuperscript{37}); and not to the supposedly “indispensable” Chinese middlemen.

Special Ban on Chinese in Priangan

The nature of the whole altered economy was epitomized by the Dutch concept of the huge plantation of Priangan. In this region no foreigners, especially Chinese,\textsuperscript{38}) were allowed to settle. It is true that from time to time, certain other non-local indigenes (such as the Central and East Javanese, Balinese, Makasarese, etc.) were also not allowed to settle there. But this was temporary; a response to the disturbances which prevailed in the area at the time.\textsuperscript{39}) By contrast, the exclusion of Chinese from the region was a permanent feature of the colonial economic policy.

That the ban was aimed specifically against Chinese is also highlighted by the VOC resolution of 18 August 1693 which mentioned the banishment of a number of Chinese to the Cape for their “temerity” to enter the region.\textsuperscript{40}) Numerous other laws, such as the 1711 and 1715 resolutions of the dyke-reeves (Heemraden) of Batavia’s environs, repeatedly reiterated the banning of Chinese from Priangan.\textsuperscript{41})

It was only in isolated cases where the service of the Chinese was understood by the Dutch to be indispensable that exceptions were made. In places experiencing labour scarcity, such as Ciasem and Pemanukan (whose labourers were absorbed by the lumbering business), “a strict exclusion of the enterprising Chinese was (therefore) impossible” [De Haan 1910: i/352]. A degree of leniency over the ban was also exercised with regard to sugar, again “because people were entirely dependent on the Chinese for the sugar industry,” and because it was impossible to prevent the geographical spread of the location of sugar mills concomitant to the irreversible diminution of wooded areas (for the mills’ fuel) around Batavia proper.\textsuperscript{42})

Another seeming exemption to the general rule of excluding the Chinese from Priangan was probably that for the cultivation of pepper. Here, too, the reason was necessity. Batavia, at least

\textsuperscript{36}) V. De Haan [1910: i/90].
\textsuperscript{37}) V. Realia [1882: i/263].
\textsuperscript{38}) V., i.a., Raffles [1830: i/315], De Haan [1910: i/104, 105, 390; 1912: iii/436; 1912: iv/550].
\textsuperscript{39}) V. De Haan [1912: iv/548].

\textsuperscript{40}) V. De Haan [1912: iii/436].
\textsuperscript{41}) V. De Haan [1912: iv/545].
\textsuperscript{42}) V. De Haan [1910: i/389, 392; 1912: iv/545].
until the liquidation, had nobody else but the Chinese to help it meet its pepper demands. Pepper, being labour intensive,\(^43\) could not be cultivated as a sideline to the staple rice (like the other cash crops). This accounts for the particular reluctance of the indigenes to take up this crop.

The Dutch’s shabby record in arbitrarily lowering prices with regard to coffee,\(^44\) moreover, did not help matters.\(^45\) Only the Chinese could fill this vacuum.

Nonetheless, even when they had to be tolerated for exceptional reasons as outlined, these Chinese were monitored closely by the Dutch. For this purpose the Chinese were subjected to a pass system which, however, only allowed them movement in strictly limited areas.\(^46\)

It was true that non-local indigenes too had to have passes to be allowed to settle in the region. However, consistent with the altered politicoeconomics, passes for them were issued free of charge.\(^47\)

That the exclusion of Chinese from Priangan was to be maintained with singularity can be gauged from the fact that even in the case of the traditionally Chinese speciality, sericulture, Batavia completely circumvented the Chinese. Thus, in GG Zwaardecroon’s reign (1718–25), the Dutch cajoled the reluctant Javans to take up this activity\(^48\); when they could easily have used the Chinese.

In sum, from about 1700 onwards the Chinese became not only useless to the emerging economy of the Dutch colony, but also inconveniently in the way of both the major parties now playing the leading roles\(^49\); an object of enmity of the indigenous privileged class (which now became the Dutch main comprador group) whose traditional place in the intermediary trade the Chinese, during the previous economic era, helped to undermine, and a source of acute embarrassment to their former Dutch masters.

All this, incidentally, was highlighted by the fact that whilst in the era of the spice trade the GGs befriended Chinese towkays (the friendship of Coen and Kapitan So Bing Kong is well-known,)\(^50\) in the new economic era one famous case was GG Zwaardecroon’s patronage of the Regent of Cianjur\(^51\) (the much-cited coffee supplier of the VOC).

More Economic Reasons for a Chinese Liquidation

To begin, a sizeable acreage of cultivated land (which could be used to cultivate the newly adopted crops) was in Chinese hands. This was of course the making of the Dutch themselves who, in their former economic policies, made the Chinese cultivate wild areas (particularly those surrounding Batavia). Initially this was to offset the VOC’s dependence on the supply of rice from Mataram.\(^52\)

\(^{43}\) \(V.\) also Rosengarten [1973: 343].
\(^{44}\) \(V.\) also De Haan [1910: i/123ff], Furnivall [1944: esp. 40].
\(^{45}\) \(V.\) also De Haan [1910: i/227].
\(^{46}\) \(V.\) De Haan [1910: i/390; 1912: iv/546].
\(^{47}\) \(V.\) De Haan [1912: iv/557].
\(^{48}\) \(V.\) De Haan [1910: i/esp. 239].
\(^{49}\) \(V.\) also De Haan [1910: i/338].
\(^{50}\) \(V.,\) i.a., Hoetink [1917: 365; 1923: 19], De Jonge [1870: v/122], Vermeulen [1938: 14].
\(^{51}\) \(V.,\) i.a., De Haan [1910: i/168; 1912: iv/376].
\(^{52}\) \(V.\) also De Haan [1922: i/130].
and subsequently (especially in case of the sugar industry and its subsidiaries) for their revenues. These Chinese lands became indispensable to the Dutch because of two basic reasons.

One, they were under the direct rule of the VOC; facilitating supervision and control over the cultivation of the newly adopted crops. Speaking on pepper, De Haan says:

... pepper cultivation ... shall be started in the ... lands which are under Batavia’s jurisdiction, its proximity (to Batavia) is considered (good) to ensure a realiable “regular delivery of the product” more than in the regency of (e.g.) Ceribon, and the Natives are less able to exercise their aversion toward this crop [than they would have been in further away places] so that only “regular supervision” (as opposed to coercive, and more costly, measures) is needed ... [De Haan 1912: iii/847].

In addition, the immediate reasons of security prevented the Dutch from operating too far afield. Two, these were lands brought to a cultivable stage from a wilderness. In the wild stage, when lands were simply appropriated by the Dutch and leased out to Chinese farmers, they “legally” belonged to nobody (the so-called “waste” lands). To “repossess” these lands was obviously far easier and much simpler for the Dutch to undertake than expropriating those belonging to indigenous socioeconomic groups with their deep-rooted customs and institutionalized obligations. Above all, the latter would have incurred the wrath of Banten in the west and Ceribon in the east (not to mention the powerful Mataram); at a time when the Dutch had not felt strong enough to tackle any of them.

The need to confiscate the Chinese-farmed lands became crucial as the plantation system eventually became the pivot whereon colonial extraction was based. Looking at it with specific regard to coffee, De Haan states:

It (the Government) would not allow the Java coffee to fall into private trade, (because) that created harmful competition; everything must be in its [government’s] hands and therefore its cultivation in other regions, (such as) Bantam or Mataram, was not tolerated [De Haan 1910: i/122].

In other words, only the lands under their direct rule (which had virtually all been farmed out to Chinese) were originally suitable for the adopted crops such as coffee. And, indeed,

The first experiments with the coffee plants had been undertaken in small gardens in the surroundings of Batavia... [ibid.: i/150].

Beside coffee, groundnut, cocoa, tea, tobacco and many others were all initially planted in Batavia’s proper environs. All this created such a demand for land that, with regard to sericulture, even

53) V. also De Haan [1922: i/130].
54) V. also, with regard to sugar, Burger [1975: i/56].
55) V. also De Haan [1922: i/130, 426].
56) V., i.a., De Haan [1910: i/230].
Chinese graveyards were expropriated by the Dutch for the growing of mulberry trees.\(^{57}\)

Also, now that sugar was fast becoming one most important cashcrop, the Dutch understandably wanted to have progressively greater control in this field. In the international market, the need for such control became increasingly urgent as (due to the growing competition of sugar from Barbados, Brazil and the Caribbean) the VOC had increasing difficulties in regulating its price.\(^{58}\) At the same time, in Indonesia’s internal economy, sugar was important for the purchase (and control) of the indigenous labour now indispensable for the economy. It created jobs at various stages of its production and one of its by-products, arak, “was vital for Batavia’s trade with the interior” [Gonggrijp 1928: 74].\(^{59}\)

A further determinant necessitating the assumption of a significantly greater role in sugar production by the Dutch was their realization that, to stay competitive, sugar must be cultivated in a plantation system. And this realization probably struck the Dutch with added force by the 18th century as Java’s sugar faced increasingly acute competition mentioned above. In other sugar producing areas, because of the use of slave labour and the proximity of these places to Holland,\(^{60}\) prices could be kept very low. By contrast, in Java up to 1740 the VOC acquired its sugar by advancing capital to Chinese contractors\(^{61}\); on whom the Dutch could hardly exercise a complete control. It seems clear that the increasing demand for the cake could only be met by confiscating the whole bakery.

It so happened that the labour requirement for the sugar industry could be fully met under the seasonal labour system. Within this requirement the indigenous labourers, unlike the Chinese, could be “allowed” to return to their villages to tend their rice (thus sparing the Dutch from the need to provide for them) between planting and harvesting/milling times. This was brazenly spelled out by the famous colonial sugar experts as follows:

Java as contrasted with most other cane growing colonies is in the favourite (sic) position of disposing of a sufficient supply of good and cheap labourers. The greatest advantage moreover is that these people are entirely free, that they are available when they are wanted and that they need neither be paid nor provided for during the time when there is no work to be done [Geerligs and Geerligs 1937].

However, in the sugar manufacture the termination of the Chinese role was far from being simple. One reason for this was because the Dutch money-lenders had sunk too much capital into the industry as it was. They were naturally reluctant to make any changes that might harm their immediate interests. There

---

\(^{57}\) V. De Haan [1910: i/240; 1912: iii/894].
\(^{58}\) For price fluctuations in Europe, s., i.a., Glamann [1958: esp. 162–164].
\(^{59}\) V. also Furnivall [1944: 41].
\(^{60}\) V., i.a., Gimbrère [1928: 28].
\(^{61}\) V., i.a., De Haan [1910: i/263].
was presumably a conflict of interests between these Dutch financiers and those who—either because they had not been committed to the industry as it was or because their ken encompassed broader perspectives—were promoting the longer-term economic policy which essentially demanded that the remaining Chinese be squeezed out. The “massacre” of the Chinese, of course, settled this conflict.

Another difficulty besetting the Dutch which needed nothing less than a drastic measure to solve was the threat against the VOC’s monopoly as posed by the Chinese client-capitalists. Excluded from participating in the altered economy, the unused capital of these Chinese became a sort of “floating capital”; rearing to jump at the slightest opportunity. The “frustrated” Chinese capitalists, so to speak, posed a corporate threat to the new monopoly economy. And it was undoubtedly because of these left out capitalists that the Dutch effort to monopolize coffee encountered difficulties. 62)

So much so that De Haan exclaimed:

In the Chinese we have inbourn [!] blacklegs [De Haan 1922: ii/35].

To prevent the Chinese from “smuggling,” therefore,

Henceforth the Chinese... who had no passes ran into the grave danger of being arrested and put in chains. ... In 1723 the transactions in coffee were made punishable and the crop was placed under the Company’s monopoly. ... Since 1730 (in order to maintain the aforesaid) the Chinese needed to have a pass to be tolerated beyond the outer posts. ... [De Haan 1910: i/104, 122, 290].

Similarly, it was in order to safeguard the monopoly of coffee and against the “fears that the Chinese will buy up this article” [ibid.: i/390] that the Priangan region, as outlined, was declared off-limit to Chinese. Although economic exigencies often necessitated the temporary exemptions to the monopoly rule, it is notable that

... for the Chinese the closure (of Priangan) was hermetic... [the Dutch] held fast to the rule that there the Chinese could not be tolerated [ibid.: i/392].

Apparently, the pressure to curtail drastically (if not ban completely) the Chinese participation in all important sectors of the economy was such that the Chinese evidently felt hemmed in; even in sugar industry. This can be gauged from the fact that since the 1650s an increasing number of Chinese capitalists opened new mills in areas under the official suzerainty of indigenous rulers such as Banten, Ceribon and the littoral of Central and East Java. 63)

It was undoubtedly to cover this loophole that in 1677 Batavia made an agreement with the Susuhunan of Mataram wherein it was stipulated that all the sugar produced in his jurisdiction should be

62) V., i.a., De Haan [1910: i/121–122; 1912: iii/499–500].

63) V., i.a., De Jonge [1870: v/CXIX; 1877: vi/XVI], Veth [1898: ii/134], Molsbergen [1939: 43].
sold only to the VOC. But the result must have been disappointing for the Dutch complained that the Chinese, in league with the local indigenes (if not the Susuhunan), sold their sugar to buyers other than the niggardly VOC.

Last but by no means least, in keeping with their volte face, the Dutch increasingly resented the fact that the Chinese occupied the “best parts” of Batavia. It is remarkable that the circulation of such resentment overlapped, time-wise, with the 18th century economic shift. When the influential chronicler-preacher Valentijn voiced his resentment in the mid-1720s, he was only voicing a sentiment which was fast becoming popular among Batavia’s Europeans. His contention that the Chinese therefore posed a threat to the security of the Dutch was quoted and requoted and later used to justify the subsequent liquidation of the Chinese.

IV The Need to Liquidate the Chinese

The change in the nature of colonial acquisition with the coming of the 18th century created a situation wherein the Chinese became expendable not only politically but also economically. In the monopoly economy being promoted by the Dutch there was no place for comparatively free traders such as the Chinese. Like the Bandanese in 1620, now the Chinese too had to be exterminated. It was to achieve and maintain monopoly in the spice trade that the Bandanese were exterminated; and it was for the same purpose (if involving different products) that the Chinese in 1740 had to be liquidated.

The evidence suggests that the liquidation of the Chinese was executed in two stages. Firstly, the Dutch taxed them to ruination. The basic capitation tax imposed on the Chinese, comprising the “head” and “hair” taxes, is a case in point. Rising and falling according to the economic exigencies, from the last quarter of the 17th century the head tax was payable by the Chinese at approx. one Rd per head per month. The fine for the failure of payment was on average 20Rds. The VOC edict of 21–29 May 1690 ordered that Chinese must wear the Chinese coiffure, with the penalty of six months in the chains (i.e., hard labour) for non-compliance. This law was renewed in 1701. Having, by these statutes, forced the Chinese to wear nothing else but “Chinese hairstyle,” the Dutch then taxed them for this “privilege.” On average, at least from 1710 the monthly hair tax was one Rd.

---

64) V., i.a., De Jonge [1870: v/CXXIX], Molsbergen [1939: 43].
65) V. also Molsbergen [1939: 43].
66) V. Valentijn [1726: iv(1)/250].
67) V., i.a., Van Hoëvell [1840a: 462fn. 1].
68) V. also Levert [1954: 53], Hanna [1978: 46ff].
69) V. Van der Chijs [1885: i/437; 1887: iii/171; 1887: iv/30].
70) V., i.a., De Jonge [1869: iv/236], Van der Chijs [1885: i/76].
71) V. Van der Chijs [1887: iii/264].
72) V. Van der Chijs [1887: iii/517].
73) V., i.a., Rogers in Harris [1744: 179].
one Rd was worth between 48 and 60 stuivers.74)

Even if we settle with the lower estimate, the compound head and hair taxes still meant that a Chinese had to pay over-three stuivers each day, for his head and hair alone; until he died (when his next of kin was to pay for his burial75) in a graveyard already paid for by the Chinese community76), or left the colony altogether (for which he had to pay even bigger "mulct," viz., 30 guilders or approx. 720 stuivers77). In actual terms, for the privilege of keeping his head and hair a Chinese had to produce, every day, the equivalent of approx. three chickens78) or over-4 2/3lbs rice.79) Such amount of chicken (given the little meat intake typical of rice-eaters) would have meant a daily feast for a family of 10 to 14, while the rice could have lasted a man for four to six days. In comparison, De Haan (who was describing the condition of prison food for the indigenes in 1772) remarks in a footnote that

The usual ration of rice for the troops etc. is 40 lbs per month ... [De Haan 1912: iv/695fn. 1]. That is to say, the defenders of the Dutch state power were living on less than 1/4 the amount of rice the Chinese had to produce to keep that part of the body which among other mortals naturally comes free of charge with the rest of their torso.

To be able to earn the money for these basic taxes, the Chinese were made to pay further for a profusion of passes. These included the pass to keep a warung (stall). Priced initially at two Rds per month,80) the warung permit was officially sold at six Rds per month by 1739.81) The penalty for non-payment was 20Rds.82) Other impositions on the Chinese included the fee for getting married, enforced from c. 1706.83) As if these were not crippling enough, the Dutch subjected the Chinese to further impediments.

In 1727, the nomad habit of a section of the Chinese [i.e., the itinerant practice of Chinese pedlars] was forbidden, and even further residence in Java was denied to many who had been settled there for a long time. Thereupon the keeping of warongs, i.e. little shops, was no longer allowed in the interior, and the means of communication with the towns were impeded [De Klerck 1938: i/364].

Unless we are to take it that the Dutch policy makers to a man were peculiarly bereft of common sense, it seems that the aim of these obviously extortionate exactions was to reduce drastically, if not destroy completely, the Chinese role in the colony's economy. At the same time,

74) Ṵ., i.a., Van der Chijs [1885: i/537], Realia [1886: iii/144, 235], Campbell [1913: ii/768].
75) Ṵ., i.a., De Haan [1922: i/504-505].
76) Ṵ., i.a., Realia [1882: i/122, 277, 279].
77) Ṵ., i.a., Crawfurd [1856: 97], Verhandeling der Munten, Maaten en Gewichten [1786: 411], Van der Chijs [1885: i/437], Realia [1886: iii/144, 235].
78) Ṵ., Batavia [1782: i/19].
79) Ṵ. Beschryving [1741: 10].
80) Ṵ., i.a., Valentijn [1726: iv(1)/246], Realia [1882: i/178, 277, 280; 1886: iv/368].
81) Ṵ., i.a., Van der Chijs [1887: iv/470].
82) Ṵ. Van der Chijs [1887: iv/470].
83) Ṵ. Realia [1882: i/500].

135
the result of these extortions eventually tipped the balance favourably for the proponents of the long-term policies of the Dutch ruling class vis-à-vis the short-sighted money-lenders as outlined. The resulting bankruptcies meant that fewer and fewer of the Chinese debtors could meet their obligations toward their Dutch creditors. As they consequently became liabilities to even the Dutch financiers, the Chinese were irreversibly manoeuvred into a corner from which there was only one alternative to being annihilated without resistance: annihilated for attempting to defend themselves. That in either case the Dutch had all the reasons to be confident of prevailing is obvious from their overwhelming superiority (politically and economically as well as militarily) over the hopelessly disparate (economically and regionally) and unarmed Chinese of Java.

Still, the Dutch would have been cheated if the victims were allowed to assimilate freely with the indigenous population. It was to preempt the “disappearance” of the Chinese in this way that the Dutch implemented segregative laws. The VOC resolution of 18 July 1713, e.g., attributed Chinese who so disappeared to committing “disorderly conduct” punishable by imprisonment. The 26 January 1717 resolution decreed that no Chinese was permitted to marry outside his community and that the VOC arrogated the powers to nullify exogamous unions. The 11 November 1721 resolution decreed that the correspondence of Chinese with the indigenous sovereigns was forbidden under the penalty of the chains.

For similar purposes, the Dutch in their treaties with various indigenous potentates as a rule insisted on claiming suzerainty over the Chinese residents of the officially autonomous states. E.g., in the 1677 treaty with Mataram, the Dutch stipulated that Mataram’s Chinese subjects must be placed under the jurisdiction and “discipline” of the VOC. The Dutch also made agreements on extradition of Chinese who tried to disappear into Mataram’s realm; the VOC resolution of 3 February 1711 attests to this. In the contract with Banten of 21 August 1731 the VOC likewise stipulated that the Bantenese should not interfere, “directly or indirectly,” with the head tax of the Chinese.

The Massacre of the Chinese

It is beyond the scope of this article

---

84) The volume of evidence that the writer has been able to gather—described in his forthcoming book, *The 1740 Massacre of the Chinese in Batavia*—convinces him that there could hardly be any question on the Dutch foreknowledge of their overwhelming politico-economic and military superiority over the Chinese who opted to defend themselves (“revolted”); let alone those who abode the Dutch and remained inside the walls of Batavia.

85) *V., i.a., Realia* [1882: i/279].
86) *V. Realia* [1882: i/279, 500, 502; 1886: iii/65].
87) *V. Realia* [1882: i/279; 1885: ii/16].
88) *V., i.a., Meinsma* [1872: i/96], also Cator [1936: 16].
89) *V. Realia* [1885: ii/53].
90) *V. Stapel* [1938: v(96)/114].
to describe fully the second (physical) stage of the Chinese liquidation. Suffice it to say that the Dutch orchestrated this liquidation first by confining the Chinese inside the walls of Batavia, stripping them of the smallest kitchen knife and putting them under a dusk-to-dawn curfew. The Dutch then armed what they themselves called “the low-class masses” [Meinsma 1872: i/132] and gave them (in establishment literature became known collectively as the “mobs”) a free hand to plunder and massacre the helpless Chinese. The rapine inside Batavia was allowed to go on from the 9th to 22nd October 1740.

While the “mobs” were despatching Chinese lives within Batavia, VOC troops liquidated those who had fled from the city before the curfew and roamed in Batavia’s environs (on the accusation that these were “revolting”). At the end of the “Grand Guignol,” as most sources agree, 10,000 city-Chinese lost their lives. Little is said about the many more who must have perished outside the city’s walls (of the 80,000-odd Chinese prior to the liquidation, only around 3,000 survived). Even less is mentioned in the existing literature of the yet far greater number who must have had what remained of their bargain-

91) V., i.a., Chronologische [1840: 61], also Raffles [1830: ii/234-235], Van Hoëvell [1840a: 478], Hoetink [1918: 459 fn.3], Vermeulen [1938: 64].
92) V., also, i.a., De Jonge [1877: ix/LXIX], Hollander [1882: 27], De Haan [1922: i/500].
93) V., i.a., De Klerck [1938: i/363].
94) V., i.a., Vleeming [1926: 6], Cator [1936: 18].
95) V. Letter 6 Nov. 1741 [1877b: 376], also Javasche Oorlogen [1830: 96], Raffles [1830: i/83; ii/236], Realia [1882: i/289].
96) V. Letter 6 Nov. 1741 [1877b: 378], Colenbrander [1925: 193], Vermeulen [1938: 89].

It is notable that the Dutch then declared an open season against Chinese all over Java. GG Valckenier mentioned that in June 1741 the Indies Council voted for a “general massacre of the Chinese over the whole of Java.” So, over six months after what as a rule was vended as an “accident” in Batavia, a rerun of the same “accident” took place in Semarang (Central Java). Likewise, In other parts of Java the violence continued...where i.a. the Chinese of Soerabaia and Grisee (East Java) were also massacred [Liem 1952: 30].

V Some Direct Results of the Liquidation

It has generally been alleged (by well meaning if unquestioning scholars as well as outright apologists) that the massacre was an “accident” or an “excess” of the Dutch reaction to an alleged Chinese “revolt.” The remarkable fit between the Dutch interests and the liquidation of the Chinese factor from the economy (not to mention that similar “accidents” were repeated all over Java) is too close for coincidence. We have seen the politicoeconomic factors which preceded (i.e., created the situation for)
the liquidation. We will now see some examples of the gains which became available to the Dutch as a direct result of this liquidation.

As mentioned, the 1700 economic shift necessitated the Dutch to confine the Chinese in towns. Political and economic motives were at play here. By flushing them out of their rural niches, the Dutch made the Chinese position even more precarious (and, thus, their bargaining power even weaker). Forbidden to invest in real estate, the Chinese had to invest in liquid assets such as cash and jewellery and (about the only form of fixed property allowed them) houses.\(^{97}\)

One of Batavia’s richest Chinese, head of the community “Kapitan” Ni Hoekong, is said to have

...lived in a very large house [filled] with expensive household contents and in which he had stored a considerable amount of cash [Hoetink 1918: 448].

Even those who were seemingly engaged in agriculture were actually “urban-orientated,” if not urban-based. Because they were implanted artificially in the colony, they were essentially “displaced” people. Having no social or political “roots” in the Dutch-ruled locality, the Chinese (in contrast to the indigenous peasantry) had no base on which they could fall back in times of crisis.

Two things characterize urban-based wealth. One, it is more conspicuous than the landed wealth. As the best place to keep one’s liquid wealth was (in the days when housebreaking incidents happened far more frequently than today) to carry it with oneself, a Chinaman rarely disappointed robbers, thieves and bullies of all kinds. Despite being repeatedly robbed, most Chinese in the Dutch colony had no other access to livelihood but to continue their peripatetic peddling or hawking practices. A robber did not bother to think that the retail goods and cash “float” of a Chinese he had robbed twice or thrice before were most probably lent to the latter on credit. What interested him, and others engaged in similar pursuits, was the fact that every time a Chinese was shaken hard enough, coins and other forms of wealth would invariably fall out of his pockets. This must have been one of the reasons for our belief that all Chinese were “rich,” as immortalized in the Javanese ditty: “Ciná, krincing-krincing ànà” (roughly: “Chinaman, chink-chink [sound of coins] he’s always loaded”).

Two, the wealth of the Chinese was therefore more “perishable” than the landed wealth. Whilst even the poorest rural labourer (if only because the greater part of his wages was in kind) was cushioned, e.g., from the effects of inflation, the Chinese were fully exposed to its ravages. In a pogrom such as of the 1740, the entire saving of an urban dweller with hardly any political leverage like the Chinese presumably perished in every sense of the word. Hence, as a result of the 1740 anti-Chinese campaign, most Chinese had no other choice but

\(^{97}\) For the latter, v. also Ong [1943: 147fn. 3].
simply to abandon their possessions, notably their lands.\footnote{V. also Chronologische [1840: 55, 56].} Consequently, after the 1740 liquidation, there was an abundance of “fallow” land in Batavia’s environs. As Krom puts it, there was “plenty of free land” \cite{Krom 1941: 92}. The resolution of 7 June 1751 also spoke of stretches of land in the region of Bogor “lying fallow,” as the former tillers had either fled or died during the 1740 liquidation.\footnote{V. De Haan [1912: iii/146].} All this, of course, created a favourable condition for Dutch incursions into formerly Chinese-tenanted areas.

### Settlement of European Colonists

The Dutch did not need much else than simply to “repossess” the lands thus “vacated” by the Chinese. All this facilitated the transfer of the formerly Chinese-tenanted land; either to the European burgher-farmers that the post-1740 regime in Batavia was again keen on importing from Europe for its colonization project or, in line with the altered economy, to favoured indigenous rulers. Hence, ... agriculture, which was exclusively undertaken by the Chinese up to the time they revolted (i.e., got liquidated) thereafter passed into European hands \cite{De Klerck 1938: i/377}.\footnote{V. also De Haan [1910: i/Personalia 42].}

Families of European farmers are known to have been planted in Bogor, Ciampea, Cipanas, Cisarua, Depok, Gadok, Jam-

bang, Krawang, Tangerang, etc.\footnote{V. Van Deventer [n.d.: ii/141-142], De Haan [1910: ii/266ff, 274; 1912: iv/95, 99ff], Krom [1941: 120].} As for the distribution of this largesse to the indigenes,

Rolution of the GG and members of the Indies Council). 17 Jan. 1741 appoints a Wangsawidjaja, Lieutenant of the Javanese, for the ownership, with whatever mortgage that applies thereupon, of a land...used to belong to the Chinese Litsiangko...\cite{De Haan 1911: ii/479 fn. 2].

This was why many indigenous partners of the altered economy, such as this Wangsawidjaja, became coffee suppliers to the VOC only after the liquidation of the Chinese.\footnote{V. also De Haan [1911: ii/478].}

No less remarkable is the evidence that, after the Chinese liquidation, there seemed to be an outburst of European propertied citizens leaving Batavia to live in the more salubrious “up country.”\footnote{V. Van Deventer [n.d.: ii/141-142], De Haan [1910: ii/266ff, 274; 1912: iv/95, 99ff], Krom [1941: 120].} Again, the Chinese liquidation in effect prepared the environs to accommodate more favourably these non-Chinese Batavian colonists.

### Coffee

The liquidation of Chinese tenant-farmers in Batavia’s environs also solved the various problems that the VOC was having with regard to coffee.

Due to the recurrent glut in the European market, the Dutch in Indonesia had been having repeated problems with

\footnote{V., i.a., Stavorinus [1798: iii/402-403].}
coffee. As the saying went at the time, the plantations in the Batavia and Ceribon regions alone surpassed the demand of the whole Europe.\(^{104}\) On top of this must be added the substantial amount of coffee produced in Mauritius, the West Indies, etc.,\(^{105}\) which had a strong lobby in Holland.\(^{106}\) Batavia had repeatedly to resort to drastic measures, such as (in 1726) halving the purchasing price.\(^{107}\) In 1733 the VOC forced Mataram’s Susuhunan to pledge on the “total extirpation” of coffee plantations in his domain.\(^{108}\) In 1735 coffee plants were rooted out in many places under the VOC’s jurisdiction.\(^{109}\)

Despite all this, the position of the VOC with regard to coffee was by 1738 quite desperate. Its “coffer was empty, its credit exhausted, and its warehouses were chock-full” with unsaleable coffee.\(^{110}\) So much so that, as the resolution of 30 October 1738 shows, Batavia had to borrow 4.8 million guldens.\(^{111}\) This continuing problem came partly from the fact that the VOC had no complete monopoly of coffee production. The Chinese planters in 1738, e.g., produced over half a million kilogrammes of coffee, nearly 29% of the total production of Priangan.\(^{112}\)

It was only after the 1740 “massacre,” in which many Chinese coffee planters/financiers perished, that the Dutch problem of over-production—or, at least, the part originating from the Chinese sector which contributed toward the overall overproduction—was solved.\(^{113}\)

Sugar

By the same default on the part of the Chinese, a substantial portion of the sugar industry and its subsidiaries (part. the distilling and trading of arak) also passed from Chinese to European hands.\(^{114}\) Most (sugar) mills changed hands and became the property of Europeans...

Van Klaveren 1953: 51.

This explains the fact that it was only in 1750 (i.e., after the Chinese liquidation) that the VOC’s monopoly over sugar became a reality.\(^{115}\)

As Lauts somewhat flipantly puts it, the “good that came out from the bad” (i.e., the advantage [for the Dutch] of the liquidation) was the entailing shift of ownership from the Chinese to the Europeans.\(^{116}\)

There were undoubtedly cases of expropriation which were less tangible. Take the case of the Dutch method of expropriation by means of capital penetration in the sugar industry. The following example of Van Riemsdijk (Commis-
sar of Native Affairs: 1776–84), *mutatis mutandis*, illustrates the multifarious ways whereby the Dutch ensured the subservience of the Chinese "partners":

... he [Van Riemsdijk] was a big sugar manufacturer, or... rather, he owned sugar mills, which he hired out to the Chinese. The resolutions of 5 and 19 Aug. 1800 elucidate the meaning of this: the Chinese manufacturers worked with the capital provided [by the Dutch] or the anticipated delivery of sugar; however the [Dutch] money-lenders practiced usury to such an extent that the whole industry was threatened with disaster. And [in all this] the greatest usurer was v.R. [van Riemsdijk] who, as it appears from the resolutions. 27 June and 5 Aug. 1800, had a claim over a certain Chinese [the sum of] 140,734Rds [De Haan 1910: i/70].

Property inside Batavia

Similar benefits were also accrued by the Dutch directly from the abandoned properties of the Chinese which were found inside the walled city of Batavia.

A day before the liquidation was officially ended, the Council of the Indies in its session of 21 October decided that the destroyed estates formerly owned or leased by the Chinese were to be sequestered or compulsorily purchased.117) The VOC edict of 13 December 1740 in effect legitimized the Europeanburghers who, during the rapine, staked their claims over Chinese properties as the new lawful owners of the properties so seized.118) All this was, of course, in perfect harmony with the ruling ideology of colonialism; the basis of which was none other than property grabbing.

In 1740 the requisitioning of Chinese properties served both the mercenary and military purposes. On the first count, properties formerly belonging to Chinese were put on the mortgage market for sale.119) In this way the Dutch ridded the Chinese from their properties without actually having to decree any special law or revoking contracts they themselves made (these properties had been either mortgaged, sold or farmed out to the Chinese by the state). With their Chinese tenants dead or incapacitated, it was sarcastic of the Dutch to have professed to "buy up" the former Chinese properties at, as De Haan [1922: i/362] puts it, "dirt cheap" prices.

With regard to the military benefit which not fortuitously accrued from the liquidation, two VOC advisors on November 1740 recommended that the clearing created by the depredations (part. in the south of the city and in areas immediately outside the southern walls) be preserved so as to give an unobstructed view from the gun emplacements and... a better aim and manoeuvrability of the cannon [Vermeulen 1938: 112, 113].120)

117) V., i.a., De Haan [1922: i/494].
118) V. Van der Chijs [1887: iv/517–518].
119) V., i.a., Official Letter [1877a: 310], Van der Chijs [1887: iv/521], Vermeulen [1938: 120].
120) V. also De Jonge [1877: ix/LXX].
Ghettoization of the Chinese

To ensure that the Chinese would never again resemble a politicoeconomic significance of anything like what they nearly became in the previous economic era, the Dutch from 1740 onwards placed the Chinese in the ghetto; the ultimate in containment policy forms next to physical liquidation.

In Batavia, this ghetto was sited in a place which was well within the range of the city's gunnery. As the VOC edict of 5 March 1741 described it, if need be the Chinese ghetto could be razed to the ground in no time by the surrounding bulwarks. From ghettos like this all over Java the Chinese emerged at dawn and to them they must return at dusk. Non-compliance to this permanent curfew entailed the pain of heavy forfeitures.

The Chinese were then besieged with layer upon layer of other forms of barriers. These included their close and continuous monitoring. The resolutions of 14 and 19 September 1742 ordered that all Chinese must register their names, addresses, occupations, etc. Those who failed to register within four days after the announcement of the laws, as the 9 October 1741 edict stated, were subject to death penalty.

As a further barrier, the Chinese were forced to carry passes or, rather, the imposition to carry passes (applied to them prior to the liquidation) was systematized and expanded. The resolutions of 14 and 19 September 1742 mentioned above imply the issuance of passes for those who had been vetted. These Chinese, including those who had become Muslim and "Parnacken" (half-breed), could enter Batavia only with further passes. However, as the 14 December 1742 edict made clear, these passes did not exempt them from being flogged in public, branded and put in chains for hard labour for 25 years should they overstay the curfew. To earn the money for these passes, the Chinese still had to buy yet another multiplicity of passes. These included the pass to use a stall in the market inside Batavia, which cost 3 1/4Rds per week.

It was part of this containment policy that the Chinese were kept alienated. To prevent the integration of the Chinese into the indigenous community, e.g., the Dutch ordered per 22 October 1742 edict that the Chinese who claimed to have become Muslim and placed themselves under the sovereignty of indigenous vassal-rulers during the 1740 liquidation be inspected by VOC "surgeons" whether or not they had actually been cum-

---

121) V. Van der Chijs [1887: iv/522], also De Haan [1922: i/494-495].
122) V., also, i.a., Van den Bosch [1942: 24].
123) V., i.a., Reaia [1882: i/280], Van der Chijs [1887: iv/577].
124) V. Van der Chijs [1887: iv/579-580].
125) V. Reaia [1882: i/306].
126) V., i.a., Van der Chijs [1887: iv/534], also Reaia [1882: i/289].
127) V. Van der Chijs [1887: iv/586-587], Reaia [1882: i/280, 289].
128) V., i.a., Reaia [1882: i/280].
On 21 December 1745 Batavia decreed the resolution stating:

By this notice the mixing (=social intercourse] between the Chinese and the Mohammedans are [declared] forbidden [Realia 1882: i/281, 468].

The 11 December 1759 resolution classified half-breeds as “full-blooded” Chinese. This had the dual purpose of maintaining the segregation policy and ensuring that, as the “full-blooded” Chinese, the Peranakans too could be taxed. In 1766 the Dutch reiterated the ban on intermarriage between Chinese and indigenes, first promulgated in 1717, and their arrogation to nullify such exogamous unions. The 21 December 1745 resolution ordered for measures to prevent the integration between Chinese and the Muslim population in general.

Even when already dead, the Chinese were segregated and confined in a burial ground specifically set aside for them. Of course, they were made to pay for the “privilege” of having their exclusive graveyards. Meanwhile, the 25 August 1755 resolution stipulated that for every dead Chinese returned to China an official tax of 50 to 100Rds must be paid. This necrophagous tax was restated by the VOC resolution of 1771. In short, the Dutch saw to it that the Chinese parted with their money; no matter where their departed was buried.

VI General Conclusions

There seems little doubt that within the plantation economy from the 1700s onwards the Chinese were intended to function as no other than the colony’s corporate scapegoat-cum-bogeyman. Behind the Chinese “screen” the Dutch hid their own (far more substantial) role in the exploitation of the Indonesian people; by parading the Chinese bogeyman (and posing as the “protector” of the indigenes), the Dutch justified their presence in Indonesia.

For their dual role of scapegoat-bogeyman the Chinese had to be kept alienated from the rest of the population; for only when thus alienated did they remain manipulable. And only when manipulable in this way could the Chinese labour reserve be used by the Dutch as a “threat factor” in the latter’s dealings with the indigenous labour force. By 1740 the Dutch ruling elite evidently felt not only that the Chinese had become expendable but also “unmanageable” and, therefore, a potential threat. This was why the Chinese had to be physically pruned.

That all this was not merely “acciden-
tal” but consequential to (therefore predictable from) a policy is corroborated also by the Dutch attitude toward the Chinese after the liquidation. In contrast to their pronouncements to the contrary (colonial propaganda speaks of “rapprochement”), the pattern of the Dutch policy vis-à-vis the Chinese from 1740 onwards remained consistently anti-Chinese. Among the first in the VOC’s Chinese containment policies was the 16 March and 3 August 1742 resolutions which actually set out to limit the number of Chinese residents by specifying the maximum total in each business field. Batavia’s Board of Aldermen specified, i.a., for 800 kitchen gardeners, 40 plumbers, 30 cobblers, 30 tailors, 20 barbers, 20 umbrella makers, etc.\(^{(138)}\)

In sum, the Chinese who remained economically active after 1740 were able to do so only by default. They existed marginally on the fringes of the colony’s distributive system. In this light, to chorus with the colonial propagandists that the overseas Chinese “controlled Indonesia’s economy” is as nonsensical as to speak of the tail that wags the dog. Similarly, to accuse them of being “privileged” (by the Dutch overlords) is to add insult to their centuries-long injury.

Sources
Abbreviations for Serials

- BTLV = Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
- TNI = Tijdschrift voor Neerland’s Indië

\(^{(138)}\) V. Vermeulen [1938: 133–134].

144


Moertono, Soemarsaid. 1968. *State and Statecraft in Old Java: a Study of the Later Mataram Period; 16th to 18th Century.* Ithaca, N. Y.


Moortono, Soemarsaid. 1968. *State and Statecraft in Old Java: a Study of the Later Mataram Period; 16th to 18th Century.* Ithaca, N. Y.


Ogg, David. 1977. *Europe of the Ancien Régime*
1715–1783. Glasgow.

Ong, Eng Die. 1943. *Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indië; Sociographie van een Indonesische Bevolkingsgroep*. Assen.


Tio, Poo Tjiang. 1923. *De Suikerhandel van Java*. Amsterdam.


———. De Gouverneur-Generaal Adriaan Valckenier en de Rade van Indië aan Bewindhebbers der Generale Oost-Indische Comp. (Heeren XVII) (Uitreksel); Batavia dd. 6 November 1741. In De Jonge 1877, ix: 372–393. (Referred to as "Letter 6 Nov. 1741")


