

# **Changing Patterns of Leadership Recruitment and the Emergence of the Professional Politician in Philippine Local Politics Re-examined: An Aspect of Political Development and Decay**

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## **Abstract**

This article is a study of leadership recruitment patterns in Philippine local politics with a focus on the extent of leadership professionalization as well as on socioeconomic and occupational backgrounds of local executives at the town level. It argues that certain patterns which had not been identified before martial law have emerged in the post-martial law period. Among the major findings are the following: those who are related to the prewar leading families are still highly represented among mayors, although those who are not related to such families continue to enter into political leadership; mayors' family backgrounds no longer have a strong bearing on their present socioeconomic status; businessmen and lawyers are the largest groups among mayors in terms of their occupation; the majority of mayors are elected without political apprenticeship; and there is little evidence that they will give up their other occupations in order to professionalize local leadership. The paper also tries to explain why these patterns have emerged and discusses their implications.

## **I Introduction**

This article investigates changing patterns of leadership recruitment in Philippine local politics. Through a comparative analysis of the data on Batangas and Capiz mayors elected in 1967 on the one hand and Batangas, Metro Manila and city mayors elected in 1992 on the other,<sup>1)</sup> it argues that certain new patterns, which had not been identified in the pre-martial law period, have emerged in the post-martial law period.

What makes the study of political leadership recruitment interesting in general is that it can explain certain characteristics in the orientation and role performance of office holders [Czudnowski 1975: 156]. Also, especially for rapidly changing societies such as the Philippines, an investigation of the change in recruitment patterns can shed light on some aspects of the

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1) The data on Batangas and Capiz mayors elected in 1967 used in this paper were taken from Machado [1974a]. For the 1992 data, see Footnote 5). In 1967, there were 31 mayors in Batangas and 17 mayors in Capiz. In 1992, there were 34 mayors in Batangas, 17 mayors in Metro Manila, and 60 city mayors (including two in Batangas and four in Metro Manila).

direction and characteristics of the transformation of the political system. A focus on the local level, in turn, is important in that, while national politics generally draws primary interest,<sup>2)</sup> examinations of local developments are indispensable for a comprehensive understanding of the whole system. Even subtle changes of the system which are yet to have any significant effect at the national level may occasionally be reflected more sensitively at the local level. Furthermore, the Philippines enacted a new local government code in 1991 with a view to having local government units "enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities . . ." [Philippines 1991: Section 2]. The local government units were given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. In assessing the prospect for local autonomy, characteristics of office holders must be taken into consideration as much as those changes in the institutional set up.

The only systematic study done so far on this subject of local leadership recruitment in the Philippines is that of Kit. G. Machado published about 25 years ago [Machado 1972; 1974a].<sup>3)</sup> His study tried to identify changes in the recruitment pattern that took place after independence. Since then no serious follow-up study has been attempted in spite of the fact that the country underwent rapid socioeconomic and dramatic political changes in the last few decades. Hence it is timely to re-examine the local leadership recruitment patterns.

What follows is divided into three parts. The first part briefly reviews Machado's argument and his supporting data of 1967. The second part presents new findings and new interpretations based on the 1992 data. Conclusions and implications are presented in the last part.

## **II Machado's Argument and Batangas and Capiz Mayors Elected in 1967**

With the introduction of elections in the Philippines early in this century, leadership positions in local politics had been assumed largely by members of wealthy, prominent families that belonged to the land-owning class. Machado argued that two important and closely related changes had taken place in this pattern of leadership recruitment in some areas particularly since independence. First, notables from old leading families were replaced by upwardly mobile men from more humble backgrounds. Second, men whose political involvement was essentially avocational were replaced by professional politicians in leadership positions in the

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2) There are two comprehensive studies on political leadership at the national level in the context of elite studies. They are Simbulan [1965] and Gutierrez [1994].

3) Judging from the fact that his article [Machado 1974a] has been included in reference lists in many books and articles on Philippine politics, it seems to have been widely read. While some scholars uncritically referred to his work, the author recently encountered some arguments that dismissed Machado's argument. One criticized the modernization theory which influenced Machado's thinking. See Rocamora [1994: xxv]. Another summarily dismissed his argument of emergence of "new men," citing today's abundance of politicians and "political clans" who had remained in office for several decades. See Sidel [1995: 11]. Therefore, it will be meaningful to re-examine the subject systematically using current data, and offer an alternative explanation.

towns [Machado 1974a: 77].

Machado considered that the primary forces behind this transformation were the impact of national politics on local communities and political competition in a context of growing mass participation. He claimed that competition and growing mass participation had been more likely to stimulate the changes in recruitment process where the level of social mobilization<sup>4)</sup> was comparatively high and the concentration of landownership was comparatively low. To support his argument, Machado collected data in a survey of all the mayors elected in 1967 in Batangas and Capiz towns. While both provinces had experienced a steady growth of mass electoral participation, they differed substantially on the two variables hypothesized to be related to the change in leadership recruitment. The level of social mobilization was considerably higher in Batangas than in Capiz. Concentration of landownership was considerably higher in Capiz than in Batangas, although it was high in both provinces [*ibid.*: 79-80].

#### A. *Local Leadership Recruitment Pattern (1967)*

Machado tried to demonstrate that the traditional pattern of leadership recruitment (leadership assumed by members of old leading families) still prevailed in most Capiz towns, while it was giving way to a new pattern (rise of upwardly mobile men from more humble backgrounds) in many Batangas towns, by comparative analyses of survey data on mayors' family backgrounds, residences, education, occupations, land holdings, socioeconomic strata, and social mobility (Tables 1-a, 2-a, and 3).

Thus, only 42 percent of Batangas mayors but 88 percent of Capiz mayors were immediate members or married to immediate members of prewar leading families. Likewise, only 32 percent of the Batangas mayors but 88 percent of the Capiz mayors were immediate members of families that had been involved in town politics to the extent that they held offices. In terms of residence, 48 percent of the Batangas mayors but only 12 percent of the Capiz mayors grew up in a barrio where residents were generally of poor and humble backgrounds. With regard to education, 62 percent of the Batangas mayors and 88 percent of the Capiz mayors at least had completed high school. Further, nearly two-thirds of those Batangas mayors who completed some college were working students, while less than 20 percent of such Capiz mayors were working students [*ibid.*: 85-89].

In terms of occupations, 39 percent of the Batangas mayors and 61 percent of their fathers were engaged primarily in agriculture, while 88 percent of the Capiz mayors and all their fathers were engaged primarily in agriculture. In addition, over a third of the Batangas mayors

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4) Social mobilization can be defined as the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior [Deutsch 1961: 494]. Machado assessed the level of social mobilization by each province's ranking on five indicators: literacy, percent of work force in nonagricultural occupations, urbanization, number of motor vehicles per 1,000 population, and percent of dwelling units with radios [Machado 1974a: 81].

**Table 1-a** Family Background, Residence, and Education of Batangas and Capiz Mayors

Item	Batangas Mayors 1992 (N = 34) (%)	Batangas Mayors 1967 (N = 31) (%)	Capiz Mayors 1967 (N = 17) (%)
Family's length of residence in town			
Less than three generations	12	16	12
Three generations or more	88	77	88
No data	0	7	0
Immediate member of prewar leading family			
Yes	47	42	88
No	53	58	12
Family politically involved to extent of elective office-holding			
Yes	71	32	88
No	29	61	12
No data	0	7	0
Residence while growing-up			
Barrio	47	48	12
Poblacion or urban center	50	42	88
Both barrio and poblacion	3	0	0
No data	0	10	0
Highest educational level attained			
Completed college or postgraduate course	76	23	41
Some college	12	29	29
Completed high school	3	10	18
Some high school	6	10	6
Completed elementary school	3	10	6
Some elementary school or none	0	10	0
No data	0	8	0

**Table 1-b** Education of City and Metro Manila Mayors  
Elected in 1992

Item	City and Metro Manila Mayors 1992 (N = 73) (%)
Highest educational level attained	
Completed college or postgraduate course	79
Some college	8
Completed high school	1
Some high school	0
Completed elementary school	0
Some elementary school or none	0
No data	11

**Table 2-a** Socioeconomic Backgrounds of Batangas and Capiz Mayors

Item	Batangas Mayors 1992 (N = 34) (%)	Batangas Mayors 1967 (N = 31) (%)	Capiz Mayors 1967 (N = 17) (%)
Primary occupation other than office-holding			
None	0	23	0
Agriculture	21 (9)	39	88
Business	68 (12)	29	0
White collar	0	0	6
Worker	0	0	0
Independent professional	24 (6)	0	6
Others	0	0	0
No data	3	9	0
Landholding			
Not engaged in farming	53	42	6
Tenant/small owner, no tenants	15	6	0
Less than 25 hectares, some tenants	15	23	29
25 to 150 hectares	12	16	53
More than 150 hectares	0	3	12
No data	6	10	0
Socioeconomic strata			
Upper	21	6	12
Upper-middle	41	29	53
Lower-middle	21	45	35
Lower	3	13	0
No data	15	7	0
Social mobility exclusive of elective office-holding			
Up	50	35	18
None	26	39	53
Down	0	19	29
No data	24	7	0

Note: Agriculture includes both farmers and fishermen.

When a mayor was engaged in two types of occupations almost equally and when it was difficult to ascertain which one was more important or he himself declared his occupation, for example, as a farmer/businessman, such a mayor was counted under two categories in order to avoid an arbitrary judgment and increase in the No Data category. The numbers of double counts are indicated in parentheses. For example, 21 percent of the Batangas mayors elected in 1992 were engaged in agriculture, and, among them, 9 percent were also engaged in other types of occupations.

had moved out of unskilled, semi-skilled, or lower white-collar positions into better jobs. As for land holdings, only 20 percent of the fathers of Batangas mayors but 77 percent of the fathers of Capiz mayors owned more than 25 hectares of land, and 23 percent of the former and none of the latter were either landless tenants or small owner-cultivator with no tenants. Socioeconomically, 26 percent of the Batangas mayors and 77 percent of the Capiz mayors came

**Table 2-b** Socioeconomic Background of City and Metro Manila Mayors Elected in 1992

Item	City and Metro Manila Mayors 1992 (N = 73) (%)
Primary occupation other than office-holding	
None	11
Agriculture	8 (3)
Business	45 (6)
White collar	0
Worker	0
Independent professional	29 (3)
Others	3
No data	10
Socioeconomic strata	
Upper	25
Upper-middle	33
Lower-middle	1
Lower	0
No data	36
Upper or upper-middle	4
Upper-middle or lower-middle	1

from upper or upper-middle class families. The largest number of the fathers of Batangas mayors (35%) were in the lower-middle stratum, while the largest number in Capiz (65%) were in the upper-middle stratum. As many as 32 percent of the former and none of the latter belonged to the lower class. Social mobility is also contrasting between the two provinces. Whereas 35 percent of the Batangas mayors and only 18 percent of the Capiz mayors moved up at least one stratum from that of their fathers, 19 percent and 29 percent of the Batangas and Capiz mayors respectively moved downward. As a result of the differential mobility, the distinction between the two groups of mayors in their socioeconomic strata was not so pronounced as in their fathers' [*ibid.*: 90-94].

All these data support the relationship which Machado thought to exist between leadership origins and level of social mobilization and concentration of landownership. In addition, he examined relationships between the family background of the Batangas mayors and other variables concerning their socioeconomic characteristics. This point, however, will be discussed later in comparison with the 1992 data.

#### B. *Professionalization of the Local Politician (1967)*

Machado then pointed to a close association between the changes in the leadership recruitment pattern and professionalization of the local politician and tried to show a substantially greater incidence of professionalism among Batangas mayors than those of Capiz using survey data on patterns of initial recruitment, primary sources of support, occupations, political apprenticeship,

**Table 3** Socioeconomic Background of Batangas and Capiz Mayors' Fathers

Item	Batangas Mayors' Fathers 1992 (N = 34) (%)	Batangas Mayors' Fathers 1967 (N = 31) (%)	Capiz Mayors' Fathers 1967 (N = 17) (%)
Primary occupation other than elective office-holding			
None	3	0	0
Agriculture	47 (6)	61	100
Business	32 (6)	10	0
White collar	3	13	0
Worker	0	6	0
Independent professional	9	6	0
Others	6	0	0
No data	6	4	0
Landholding			
Not engaged in farming	35	26	0
Tenant/small owner, no tenants	41	23	0
Less than 25 hectares, some tenants	9	23	23
25 to 150 hectares	6	10	65
More than 150 hectares	6	10	12
No data	3	8	0
Socioeconomic Strata			
Upper	6	13	12
Upper-middle	21	13	65
Lower-middle	21	35	23
Lower	32	32	0
Lower-middle or lower	3	0	0
No data	18	7	0

and tenure as indices of professionalization (Table 4). He defined professional political leadership, first, as a specialized political activity rather than an adjunct of a general social role and, second, as a career rather than an avocation [*ibid.*: 100].

Machado argued that intense competition after independence had created growing demands for rural vote mobilization on behalf of national politicians, and that a corresponding infusion of external resources had occurred to support such efforts. Such demands created a need for political specialists in each town. Skills and qualities pertinent to mass political mobilization such as good public relations, generosity, being approachable, being well known and a skill in using the support of their following to bargain for outside resources that could be used to expand and maintain that following became the chief criteria for leadership recruitment. In areas of comparatively high social mobilization and low concentration of landownership, the needed skills and qualities were more widely distributed among the population than were the skills and qualities useful under conditions of lower social mobilization and higher concentration of landownership where a greater degree of political support could be built on the basis of traditional kinds of relationships such as the extended family [*ibid.*: 99-106].

**Table 4** Association between Family Background and Socioeconomic Origins of Batangas Mayors Elected in 1967

Item	Mayors Themselves Members of Prewar Leading Families (N = 12) (%)	Mayors Not Themselves Members of Prewar Leading Families (N = 19) (%)
Family politically involved to extent of elective office-holding		
Yes	75	5
No	17	89
No data	8	6
Residence while growing		
Barrio	17	68
Poblacion or urban center	67	26
Barrio and poblacion	0	0
No data	16	6
Socioeconomic strata of fathers		
Upper	33	0
Upper-middle	25	5
Lower-middle	33	37
Lower	0	53
Lower-middle or lower	0	0
No data	9	5
Socioeconomic strata of mayors		
Upper	17	0
Upper-middle	42	21
Lower-middle	33	53
Lower	0	21
No data	8	5
Educational Attainment		
At least high school graduate	67	58
Less than high school graduate	17	37
No data	16	5
Social mobility exclusive of office-holding		
Up	17	47
None	42	37
Down	33	11
No data	8	8

Note: There were 19 mayors who were not themselves members of prewar leading families. One of them was included in the group classed as being immediately related to a prewar leading family in the original analysis exclusively on the strength of his wife's family background. The distinction here is between those who were themselves immediate members of a prewar leading family and those who were not.



Once recruited to a position of leadership, men from more humble backgrounds were strongly motivated to professionalize the role or to make a career of office-holding. Machado wrote:

Political leaders from old leading families often provided for regular succession to leadership positions from within the extended family. This meant in many cases that men were able to step into official positions without serving an apprenticeship. It also meant that they might readily step out of an official position and, the post having gone to a close relative, remain near the center of power. New men, lacking such a family background, normally had to serve a political apprenticeship and build a large personal following and/or develop party or faction support. Even then, such a following or support was not readily transferable to another. Hence, if they achieved an official position and aspired to stay near the center of power, they had good reason to try to make a career of office-holding. [*ibid.*: 104-105]

Machado considered that a decline in the importance of the family and the development of more specialized political organization both in the recruitment process and as a base of political support were indications of increasing professionalization of leadership roles. Fifty-two percent of the Batangas mayors but only 29 percent of the Capiz mayors were recruited through a party or a faction. For 81 percent of the Batangas mayors and only 41 percent of the Capiz mayors, party or faction *leaders* or personal followers were most important to them in winning elections [*ibid.*: 106-111].

With regard to occupation, 23 percent of the Batangas mayors had no other occupation than being mayor, while all the Capiz mayors had another occupation. In terms of political apprenticeship, not so significant difference was observed between Batangas and Capiz mayors. However, when family background was controlled, a clear distinction emerged. Among those who were not from a prewar leading family, the vast majority of whom were in Batangas, 70 percent had held a lower elective office before they worked their way up to the position of mayor, while 25 percent had never held a lower elective office. Those mayors who were members of a prewar leading family were almost evenly divided between these two categories [*ibid.*: 111-113].

Other indications that man has made a career of political leadership and become a professional politician are long-time involvement in politics and long tenure in office. Fifty-eight percent of Batangas mayors but only 41 percent of Capiz mayors had been actively involved in politics for 20 or more years. Similarly, 42 percent of the former but 29 percent of the latter had been in elective office for a total of four terms or more. Twenty-three percent of the former but only 6 percent of the latter had served as mayor four terms or more [*ibid.*: 113-115].

### III Batangas, Metro Manila and City Mayors Elected in 1992<sup>5)</sup>: New Findings and New Interpretations

From the argument reviewed in the foregoing section, the following two hypotheses can be derived. First, the change in the local leadership recruitment pattern and professionalization of the local politician will be more pronounced in areas of highest social mobilization such as those directly within the orbit of Manila, the few urban centers and the larger towns [*ibid.*: 119]. Second, as social mobilization in a town increases, those changes become more pronounced in that town.

To test these two hypotheses, relevant data of all Batangas, Metro Manila and city mayors elected in 1992 were collected.<sup>6)</sup> Social mobilization in cities and Metro Manila towns is significantly higher than in Batangas towns. Social mobilization in Batangas in 1992 is also undoubtedly higher than in 1967.

#### A. *Local Leadership Recruitment Pattern (1992)*

Only two of the indices regarding the leadership recruitment pattern yield data which conform to the expected changes. These two are occupations and social mobility (Tables 2-a and 2-b). The importance of agriculture as an occupational background had declined dramatically. As many as 68 percent of the Batangas mayors and 45 percent of the city and Metro Manila mayors

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5) Of the 34 Batangas and the 73 city and Metro Manila mayors elected in 1992, 24 (71%) of the former and 55 (75%) of the latter were re-elected in 1995. Therefore, it will be reasonable to presume that what can be said about those mayors elected in 1992 is more or less applicable to those elected in 1995. Regarding the mayors re-elected in 1988, 22 (65%) in Batangas and 34 (47%) in cities and Metro Manila towns were elected in 1992.

6) The following data gathering methods were used. For Batangas mayors, the author employed research assistants to conduct interviews with mayors using interview guidelines in 1994. For city and Metro Manila mayors, he used a questionnaire by mail in the same year. The interview guidelines were constructed based on Machado's format [Machado 1972: 493-504] in order to make comparisons with his 1967 data possible. So was the questionnaire, although some questions were omitted in order to make it as simple as possible and raise the response rate. Further, in order to make up for insufficient data, mayors' bio-data filed at the League of Cities and those filed with their certificates of candidacy at the Commission on Elections were utilized. (Although it is not required to submit bio-data together with the certificate of candidacy, some candidates do submit their bio-data.) With regard to categories of socioeconomic strata to classify mayors and their fathers, Machado employed the categories developed by John Carroll [Carroll 1965: 87-88], and the author employed the same categories in order to compare the 1967 and the 1992 data in a consistent and meaningful way. Carroll's classification is as follows: *upper* — owners of major businesses, landowners with more than 150 hectares; *upper-middle* — professionals (other than grade school teachers), executives and officials in large businesses or government, owners of import-export, wholesale, or large retail businesses, landowners with 25-150 hectares; *lower-middle* — those with white-collar or technical skills, grade school teachers, first-level supervisors, owners of retail businesses with a few employees, landowners with less than 25 hectares but with some tenants; *lower* — unskilled and semiskilled laborers, businessmen without employees (i.e., peddlers and *sari-sari* storeowners), tenant farmers and owner-cultivators without tenants.

were businessmen, while 21 percent of the former and only 8 percent of the latter were engaged in agriculture. Also, the number of independent professionals (mostly lawyers) had considerably increased, overtaking the number of agriculturists both in Batangas and in cities and Metro Manila. With regard to social mobility, at least 49 percent of the Batangas mayors moved up at least one stratum from that of their fathers. This number is significantly higher than in 1967.

However, data on other indices contradict the expected changes (Tables 1-a and 1-b). Regarding family backgrounds,<sup>7)</sup> 47 percent of Batangas mayors elected in 1992 were immediate members or married to immediate members of prewar leading families of their respective towns. The remaining 53 percent of the mayors did not belong to such families. These figures, as well as the figures that indicate their families' length of residence in their respective towns, do not differ significantly from the corresponding figures in 1967, and seem to suggest that the change in the family background had reached a plateau. However, the 53 percent is already quite high and, considering marriage between members of prewar leading families and those who are not, representation by non-prewar leading families in local leadership must be greater than the figure appears to suggest. This point is important in a bilateral kinship system with extended families.<sup>8)</sup> As for political involvement of mayors' families, 71 percent of the families had been involved in their towns' politics to the extent of office-holding, while the corresponding figure in 1967 was only 32 percent. Among the mayors who belonged to prewar leading families, the figure went up to 88 percent. Even among the mayors who were not members of prewar leading families, the figure was still 56 percent. This indicates that the second generation of the "new men" in the postwar period had an advantage in attaining a local leadership position.

With regard to education, no less than 91 percent of the Batangas mayors at least had completed high school, and as high as 76 percent had completed college or a postgraduate course. Of the city and Metro Manila mayors, while the data on 11 percent were not available, all the rest (89%) at least had completed high school and 80 percent had completed college or a postgraduate course. These figures, when compared with those of 1967, seem to suggest the prevalence of higher education among a larger segment of the population as well as to indicate higher social mobility through education. Education is no longer an effective criterion to identify different socioeconomic origins of mayors.

Data on socioeconomic strata is worth noting (Tables 2-a and 3). At least 27 percent of the Batangas mayors came from upper or upper-middle class families and at least 55 percent

7) Regarding city and Metro Manila mayors, although it is difficult to ascertain their family backgrounds percentagewise due to insufficiency of data, they did include both men from prewar leading families and those not from such families. Examples of the former were Alfredo L. Montelibano, Jr. of Bacolod City, Tomas R. Osmeña of Cebu City, Jesus D. Durano of Danao City, and Adelbert W. Antonino of General Santos City. The latter group included Ruben L. Umali of Lipa City, Imelda C. Roces of Legaspi City, Jesse Robredo of Naga City, and Jejomar Binay of Makati.

8) If one has a father (or mother) who is a member of prewar leading family and a mother (or father) who is not, he generally answers that he is a member of a prewar leading family. To what extent this kind of intermarriage is taking place, though, is a matter of empirical investigation.

came from lower-middle or lower class families. These figures are not significantly different from those of 1967. However, as a result of the higher incidence of upward social mobility, the Batangas mayors elected in 1992 on the average belong to socioeconomic strata one level higher than those in 1967. Thus, while the statuses of 15 percent of them were not ascertained, at least 21 percent belonged to the upper class; 40 percent, the upper-middle class; 21 percent, the lower-middle class; and only 3 percent, the lower class. These figures are even comparable to those of the Capiz mayors elected in 1967. This point will be discussed further in the next section.

Lastly, changes in the association between the family background and some socioeconomic variables must be discussed. With regard to the Batangas mayors elected in 1967, whether one came from a prewar leading family or not strongly influenced his socioeconomic characteristics (Table 4). Fully 75 percent of the mayors from prewar leading families but only 5 percent of the mayors not from such families had immediate relatives who had held elective offices in their towns. Only 17 percent of the mayors from prewar leading families but as many as 68 percent of those not from such families grew up in a barrio. Whereas only 33 percent of those from prewar leading families came from lower-middle stratum, 90 percent of those not from such families came from lower-middle and lower socioeconomic strata. Mayors not from prewar leading families as a whole clearly had a higher standing in socioeconomic strata than had their fathers, and, among these men, the degree of upward mobility as assessed by occupation exclusive of office-holding was 47 percent. On the other hand, there was much less upward mobility and greater downward mobility among mayors from prewar leading families.

As for the Batangas mayors elected in 1992, in contrast, the distinction in socioeconomic profiles between the two groups had become blurred (Table 5). Differences in some indices were much narrower. Eighty-eight percent of the mayors from prewar leading families and 56 percent of those not from such families had immediate relatives who had held elective offices in their towns. Thirty-eight percent of the former and 56 percent of the latter grew up in a barrio. Regarding the socioeconomic strata of the mayors and their fathers, and their social mobility as well as their educational attainment, the data suggest that the differences between the two groups were no longer so significant. With regard to occupation, however, it is noteworthy that, while 25 percent of those from prewar leading families were primarily engaged in agriculture, none of those not from prewar leading families were full-time farmers. Although 17 percent of them were engaged in agriculture, they were at the same time almost equally engaged in business. On the other hand, both prewar leading families and non-leading families produced businessman-mayors, with the latter families at a slightly higher ratio, and the same number of independent professional-mayors.

#### B. *Professionalization of the Local Politician (1992)*

Data on the indices of professionalization support the hypotheses only to some extent and at the same time indicate a new trend. All the Batangas mayors and no less than 89 percent of the city and Metro Manila Mayors elected in 1992 had some other occupations than being mayor,

**Table 5** Association between Family Background and Socioeconomic Origins of Batangas Mayors Elected in 1992

Item	Mayors Themselves Members of Prewar Leading Families (N =16) (%)	Mayors Not Themselves Member of Prewar Leading Families (N =18) (%)
Family politically involved to extent of elective office-holding		
Yes	88	56
No	13	44
No data	0	0
Residence while growing up		
Barrio	38	56
Poblacion or urban center	63	39
Barrio and poblacion	0	6
No data	0	0
Socioeconomic strata of fathers		
Upper	6	6
Upper-middle	31	11
Lower-middle	13	28
Lower	38	28
Lower-middle or lower	0	6
No data	13	23
Socioeconomic strata of mayors		
Upper	25	17
Upper-middle	50	33
Lower-middle	13	28
Lower	0	6
No data	13	17
Educational attainment		
At least high school graduate	94	89
Less than high school graduate	6	11
No data	0	0
Social mobility exclusive of elective office-holding		
Up	56	44
None	25	28
Down	0	0
No data	19	28
Primary occupation other than office-holding		
None	0	0
Agriculture	25	17 (17)
Business	56 (6)	78 (17)
White collar	0	0
Worker	0	0
Independent professional	25 (6)	22 (6)
Others	0	0
No data	0	6

whereas 23 percent of the Batangas mayors elected in 1967 had no other occupation (Tables 2-a and 2-b). As for political apprenticeship, 68 percent of the former and at least 41 percent<sup>9)</sup> of the latter had never held a lower elective office prior to their election as mayor, while the corresponding figures of 1967 were 42 percent in Batangas and 41 percent in Capiz (Tables 6, 7 and 8). When family background of the Batangas mayors elected in 1992 was controlled, even among those who were not members of prewar leading families, at least 61 percent were elected mayor without having served in any lower elective office. When it comes to those who were members of prewar leading families, the figure went up to 75 percent (Table 10). Regarding years of active political involvement as of 1992, only 26 percent of the Batangas mayors had been actively involved in politics for 20 or more years, and at least 44 percent for less than 10 years (Table 6).<sup>10)</sup>

**Table 6** Recruitment and Career Patterns of Batangas and Capiz Mayors

Item	Batangas Mayors 1992 (N = 34) (%)	Batangas Mayors 1967 (N = 31) (%)	Capiz Mayors 1967 (N = 17) (%)
Father's political involvement to extent of elective office-holding			
Yes	29	23	71
No	65	71	29
No data	6	6	0
Elective office-holding prior to first election as mayor			
None	68	42	41
One or more terms	32	55	59
No data	0	8	0
Years of active political involvement			
9 or less	44	19	18
10 to 19	24	10	41
20 or more	26	58	41
No data	6	13	0
Total terms in elective office			
One	26	23	29
Two	41	19	23
Three	18	16	18
Four or more	9	42	29
No data	6	0	0
Terms as mayor			
One	41	42	71
Two	41	23	18
Three	9	13	6
Four or more	6	23	6
No data	3	0	0

9) Three mayors who had held only higher elective positions (4%) were added to the 37 percent that had never held elective positions.

**Table 7** Office-Holding Prior to First Election as Mayor

	Batangas Mayors 1992 (N = 34) (%)	City and Metro Manila Mayors 1992 (N = 73) (%)
None	24	18
Elective (lower)	32 (18)	41 (25)
Elective (higher)	0	5* (3)
Chief of police	3	1
Fiscal	3	8 (5)
Appointive mayor**	26 (15)	26 (21)
Other appointive	32 (18)	15 (8)
Judge	0	3 (3)
Civil service	3 (3)	4 (4)
Others	9 (3)	3 (3)
No data	0	16

\* The five percent includes Richard Gordon of Olongapo City (delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention), Salvador C. Sering of Surigao City (Vice-Governor of Surigao del Norte in 1980), Adelbert W. Antonino of General Santos City (Congressman in 1987), and Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. of Quezon City (Batasang Pambansa Assemblyman in 1984 and Congressman in 1987). Mathay, however, was elected Vice-Mayor in 1967, and, therefore, is counted under two categories.

\*\* Those mayors who were promoted from vice-mayor without election as well as OIC appointees are included in this category.

\*\*\* The figures add up to more than 100%, because some mayors fall in more than one category. The numbers in parentheses indicate percentages of those mayors who are also counted under other categories.

**Table 8** Total Terms in Elective Office before Becoming Mayor

	Batangas Mayors 1992 (N = 34) (%)	City and Metro Manila Mayors 1992 (N = 73) (%)
None	68	37
One	24	25
Two	0	16
Three	0	4
Four or more	3	0
Number of terms not identified	6	0
No data	0	18

The above figures suggest that professionalization of the local politician did not develop as much as expected. Among the Batangas mayors elected in 1992, only 15 percent or five persons barely fit in with Machado's image of professional politician—a man of humble socioeconomic background who has worked himself from a lower office up to a position of political leadership

10) Regarding terms in office, meaningful comparison is difficult, because of the suspension of local elections between 1971 and 1980 local elections due to martial law and of the postponement of the next local elections until 1988 due to the "revolution."

**Table 9** Association between Family Background and Indicators of Professionalization of Batangas Mayors Elected in 1967

Item	Mayors Who Were Members of Prewar Leading Families (N =13) (%)	Mayors Who Were Not Members of Prewar Leading Families (N =18) (%)
Initial recruitment		
Family	54	17
Faction/party/"big man"	23	78
No data	23	5
Elective office-holding prior to first election as mayor		
None	62	28
One or more terms	38	67
No data	0	5
Total terms in elective office		
One	38	11
Two	23	17
Three	15	17
Four or more	23	56

Note: The difference between the N here and in Table 4 is accounted for by the fact that there the distinction was between mayors who were themselves members of prewar leading families and those who were not. Here one mayor who was not himself a member but who had married into a prewar leading family is accounted in the first rather than in the second category.

**Table 10** Association between Family Background and Indicators of Professionalization of Batangas Mayors Elected in 1992

Item	Mayors Who Were Members of Prewar Leading Families (N =16) (%)	Mayors Who Were Not Members of Prewar Leading Families (N =18) (%)
Initial Recruitment		
Family	44	11
Faction/party/"big man"	13	22
No data	44	67
Elective office-holding prior to first election as mayor		
None	75	61
One or more terms	25	39
No data	0	0
Total terms in elective office		
One	31	22
Two	38	44
Three	13	22
Four or more	19	0
Not ascertained	0	11



and makes a career out of it.<sup>11)</sup> This number is even lower than the figures in Batangas and Capiz in 1967, and there was little sign that they would give up their other occupations. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that, although the number is small, 11 percent (eight persons) of the city and Metro Manila mayors did not have other occupations than being mayor.<sup>12)</sup> All of them had held government positions prior to their election as mayor. Two were fiscals; one was a chief of police; and the remaining five had held lower elective positions. These five or 7 percent of the city and Metro Manila mayors were considered professional politicians in a strict sense, having served political apprenticeship and made a career out of elective office.

Meanwhile, those mayors who were members of prewar leading families and primarily engaged in agriculture, a type commonly found among Capiz mayors elected in 1967, had become a small minority. Of the Batangas mayors elected in 1992, 21 percent or seven persons were engaged in agriculture, and only four persons were from prewar leading families. As for the city mayors, only six persons were primarily engaged in agriculture. There was no agriculturist in Metro Manila.

In their place, new kinds of people had come to dominate the scene. The largest group was businessmen, many of whom were quite wealthy. In contrast to the fact that in 1967 only 29 percent of the Batangas mayors and none of the Capiz mayors were businessmen, 68 percent of the Batangas mayors elected in 1992 were businessmen. (Among those who were members of prewar leading families, 56 percent were businessmen, while 78 percent were businessmen among those who were not.) Of these businessman-mayors, at least 57 percent belonged to the upper or upper-middle class because of their business, and at least 61 percent were elected mayor without serving in any lower elective positions. Regarding the city and Metro Manila mayors, at least 45 percent were businessmen, and of these businessmen at least 45 percent were owners of major businesses. (Since the business scale of another 33 percent was not ascertained, the actual number would be significantly higher.) Further, at least 55 percent<sup>13)</sup> had never held any lower elective positions (Table 11).

The above figures suggest that the majority of the successful mayoral candidates had first acquired wealth through business, which they would spend for their election campaign. Usually, these people were stronger mayoral candidates than those who had worked themselves up from lower elective offices. Only having such skills and qualities as good public relations, generosity, being approachable and being well known was far from enough for vote mobilization to win the top local position. Intense political competition in the context of mass participation along with socioeconomic change had provoked growing particularistic demands on the part of voters. Local factions which once had been organized around leading families based on kinship and traditional patron-client relations had transformed into politically specialized organizations,

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11) These five persons were from lower or lower-middle class families that were not prewar leading families, and had served at lower elective positions. All of them, however, had other occupations than being mayor.

12) This does not exclude the possibility that their family members had their own business.

13) Two mayors who had held only higher elective positions were added to 48 percent.

**Table 11** Socioeconomic Status and Previous Office-Holding of Businessman-Mayors Elected in 1992

Item	Batangas Mayors 1992 (N = 23) (%)	City and Metro Manila Mayors 1992 (N = 33) (%)
Socioeconomic strata		
Upper	30	45
Upper-middle	26	12
Lower-middle	26	0
Lower	4	0
No data	13	33
Upper or upper-middle	0	6
Upper-middle or lower-middle	0	3
Elective office-holding prior to first election as mayor		
None	61	48
One	30	21
Two	0	9
Three	0	3
Four or more	0	0
No data	9	18

namely, machine [Scott 1969; Machado 1971; 1972; Nowak and Snyder 1974; Curry 1976; Wolters 1984; Kimura 1997].<sup>14)</sup> It had come to require considerable resources to maintain factions and wage effective election campaign. Under these conditions, wealthy businessmen emerged as the fittest mayoral candidates. At the same time, this situation opened a way for "new men," as well as for men from diversifying traditional landed families, to capture the top local positions via business success.<sup>15)</sup> The reason why leadership professionalization has not developed so much with these people in the top local positions is that, when they were elected, there was little incentive for them to give up their business in order to concentrate on running local government. Their income from business was much higher than their official salaries. Their office could even be instrumental in getting lucrative business opportunities.<sup>16)</sup>

14) The reason for using the machine model is that, although many different approaches have been proposed and employed to overcome limitations of the clientelistic approach, the author still considers that the machine model has the highest explanatory power as far as electoral politics is concerned. Those phenomena that can not be explained by the machine model include the success of so-called "show-biz" candidates and some non-traditional politicians. For good discussions on other approaches, see, for example, Kerkvliet [1995].

15) Unlike agriculture, their business activities were not confined to their respective localities.

16) In fact, some of the mayors' businesses were government dependent. For example, at least 6 city and Metro Manila mayors and 3 Batangas mayors were contractors, a term which in the Philippine context generally involves public works, or owners of construction businesses, which also deal with public works. In addition, there were mayors who expanded their businesses or started new ones after they were elected. These facts agree with the recent arguments that explain the Philippine political economy in terms of state-society relations using such concepts as weak state [Rivera 1994; McCoy ↗

Following the businessmen in number were independent professionals, the majority of whom were lawyers.<sup>17)</sup> In 1967, none in Batangas and only 6 percent of the Capiz mayors were independent professionals. In 1992, 24 percent of the Batangas mayors and at least 29 percent of the city and Metro Manila mayors were independent professionals. Of the former, 50 percent or 4 persons were lawyers, and of the latter, 57 percent or 12 persons were lawyers. Among others were doctors, educators, consultants, etc. They were all highly educated and belonged to the upper-middle class. Interestingly, the majority of them had held appointive government positions before becoming mayor, and this clearly distinguishes them from the agriculturists and the businessmen. As many as 75 percent (6 persons) of these independent professionals in Batangas and 57 percent (12 persons) of them in cities and Metro Manila had held appointive government positions, while the corresponding figures for the agriculturist- and businessman-mayors were 43 percent and 52 percent in Batangas and 33 percent and 39 percent for cities and Metro Manila towns.<sup>18)</sup> In terms of political apprenticeship, however, only 25 percent (2 persons) of them in Batangas and 43 percent (9 persons) in cities and Metro Manila had held lower elective positions, and in this regard they are no more professional politicians than the businessman-mayors.

Speaking of previous government positions held by mayors, OIC (Officer-in-Charge) appointees during the "revolutionary" period deserve special attention, although they are not mutually exclusive with the above-discussed categories based on occupational backgrounds. Thus, 26 percent (9 persons) of the Batangas mayors and 26 percent (19 persons) of the city and Metro Manila mayors elected in 1992 had held mayorship through appointment prior to their election as mayor, and 21 percent (7 persons) of the former and 16 percent (12 persons) of the latter were OIC appointees in the wake of the "people power revolution." These facts indicate that one's appointment as mayor gave him clear advantage in running for an election.

Other appointive positions in government previously held by the mayors were various<sup>19)</sup> and no single category has a sizable number. The only exception is law enforcement agents, namely, fiscals which accounted for 3 percent in Batangas and 8 percent in cities and Metro Manila; chiefs of police, 3 percent in the former and 1 percent in the latter; and judges, 3 percent in the latter. Put together, their number appeared significant. It is probable that they

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\ 1993; Sidel 1995] and patrimonial state [Hutchcroft 1991]. These theories, in turn, can explain how politically interested businessmen succeed in their business.

17) Interestingly, businessmen and lawyers also constituted the largest and the second largest groups among the congressmen elected in 1992 in terms of occupational background other than public office-holding. See Gutierrez [1994: 47-55].

18) Even discounting the fact that these appointive positions included OIC positions in local governments in the wake of the "revolution," these figures are still significant, while the 1967 data did not take this point into consideration.

19) These positions included appointive or OIC vice-mayor and councilor, sectoral representative to municipal council, sectoral representative to provincial board, municipal health officer and agriculturist, provincial assistant investigator, civil security officer, water district board chairman, etc.

emerged as strong contenders for local leadership at least partly because their offices were instrumental for them to build up electoral support. Chiefs of police and fiscals can project their images as crime-busters in the towns where peace and order is an important issue. Also, there could be uncountable instances in which they satisfied the particularistic demands of their followers by not enforcing law strictly. Furthermore, the law enforcement agents are quite frequently involved in amicable settlement of disputes between private parties. While any influential third party could get involved in such settlements, they usually play the most important role in grave cases which involve criminal charges.<sup>20)</sup> Especially when the aggrieved party is poor and powerless and the accused is rich and politically influential, various difficulties and obstacles hinder the former from pursuing the case within the legal system and have the latter brought to justice. By amicable settlement, the aggrieved can get at least a modicum of reparation, and the accused can be discharged with considerably less than what the law would demand.<sup>21)</sup> By engaging in dispute settlements in the extra-judiciary way, politically ambitious law enforcement agents can increase followers and supporters that can be mobilized in elections.<sup>22)</sup>

#### IV Conclusions and Implications

It was shown in the foregoing sections that the 1992 data did not agree with all the expected changes which could be extrapolated from the trend found in the pre-martial law period. While upwardly mobile men from more humble backgrounds continued to enter into the political arena, the ratio of these "new men" assuming local leadership positions had hardly changed from the 1967 data and the second generation of the "new men" were also found among the mayors. At the same time, many of the prewar leading families had still kept their hold over local politics to a considerable degree. These facts indicate that circulation of local political elite had been taking place more slowly than the 1967 data appeared to suggest. Also, the emergence of the second generation of the "new men" in particular seems to indicate that they have a tendency toward "dynasty" building as much as the traditional political families. This, together with the narrowing difference in socioeconomic profiles between the "new men" and those mayors who were members of prewar leading families, poses the question of whether the former are more significantly different in their political behavior from the latter than the latter from their fathers.

Further, there was little evidence that professionalization of the local politician in the way

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20) For example, murder.

21) For excellent research on amicable settlement, see Machado [1979; 1983].

22) For example, in Lipa City where chiefs of police and fiscals have been strong contenders for mayorship and two of the three elected postwar mayors were former chiefs of police, one chief of police who ran and placed second in the 1992 local elections told the author that the main reason for their strong showing was *areglo* (amicable settlement). Interview with Ricardo Macala, Residence, Lipa City, Batangas, April 5, 1989.

Machado had suggested was going on. Compared with those Capiz and Batangas mayors elected in 1967 in terms of percentage, more mayors, “new men” included, captured their top local positions without serving any lower elective posts. In addition, almost all the mayors had other occupations than being mayor and were unlikely to give them up. Nonetheless, they have strong incentive—probably much more than mayors from old leading families in the traditional setting—to try to remain in office for long, because in many cases it is in their occupational interests as well. Therefore, a certain degree of professionalization can be expected depending on how long they stay in their positions after they become mayor.<sup>23)</sup> Under such circumstances, it may be more appropriate to say that they have a double profession than another type of avocation.

The new findings can be explained consistently with the past data in terms of political development and decay. Machado's interpretation of the 1967 data fit in well with some salient elements of more or less optimistic political modernization theories prevailing in the 1960s and early 1970s such as structural differentiation and specialization, achievement criteria rather than ascription, popular participation and mobilization, etc. As Samuel P. Huntington pointed out, however, the broader process of modernization does not necessarily entail political development and often brings about political decay [Huntington 1965: 386-430].<sup>24)</sup> It must also be noted that elements of both development and decay can coexist simultaneously. The point is which elements are more pronounced at a certain time. The current state of local leadership recruitment patterns should be viewed as a result as well as a reflection of the present stage of the mixture of development and decay in the political system.

One important aspect of change in Philippine local politics since independence, as already mentioned, is the transformation of the traditional faction into machine.<sup>25)</sup> Patron-client ties that constitute factions have lost their once affective, all-purpose nature. Now having little legitimacy, the vertical ties can be maintained only by concrete, short-run, materialistic inducements. Consequently, factional contests have become extremely costly and graft-prone, and increased inflationary pressure and inefficient allocation of resources. Therefore, in spite of its politically specialized functions, machine should be considered as an expression of decay rather than as an indication of development. This explains the suspension and even a certain extent of reversal of the movement toward increase of the “new men” and professionalization of the local politician, as well as the negative aspects of local leadership performance.

Nonetheless, some aspects of the current state of local leadership recruitment patterns possibly have positive effects on local government and politics. One is diversity in the occupational backgrounds of mayors resulting from socio-economic transformation and differentiation. The activities and specializations of businessmen and independent

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23) The 1987 Constitution prohibits local officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. They, however, can be re-elected for more than three terms unconsecutively or seek other elective positions.

24) For application of “political development and decay” in the Philippine context, see Wurfel [1988].

25) Machado was fully aware of this. See Machado [1971; 1974b].

professionals are far more diverse than those of agriculturists. Local leaders can be recruited through electoral choice from an increasing number of candidates with a wide range of different skills and talents in a way to meet specific conditions of different towns. For example, while redistributive kinds of social reform may not be expected, businessmen's managerial skill can make them more effective local executives in running the government organizations and implementing various projects than those who have worked their way up from lower elective offices. Further, the new local government code, which gives more powers and resources to the local government units will attract a larger number of more competent people to seek local leadership positions.

Finally, what will the future of local leadership recruitment patterns look like? Since there are many factors and uncertainties that may affect the patterns, it would be unrealistic to predict the entire picture. At least, however, the following may be said about social mobility and professionalization of the local politician. Regarding the first point, entry of "new men" into local leadership positions will not diminish, if not increase sharply, in the long run. While the bilateral kinship system circumscribes the endurance of "dynasties" over generations, the decline of local sources relative to national sources of political power also makes local politicians' careers vulnerable to national politics and hence less stable. Furthermore, although scions of political families definitely have an edge over those who are not, the increasing social mobilization will continue to open up new political opportunities for the latter.

In relation to the second point, one reason why Machado's prediction did not come true is that the specialization of political organization or the transformation of the traditional faction into machine did not entail institutionalization of political parties. On the contrary, they are becoming increasingly unstable [Kimura 1997; Lande 1996]. As long as the parties remain loose personal alliance systems, and the campaign financing primarily the responsibility of individual candidates, professionalization of the local politician will not make much progress. Nonetheless, although the present situation may not change soon, there still is a possibility that sometime in the future, along with further socioeconomic transformation, new types of political organization which emphasize horizontal class and/or functional group ties will grow and become the basis of political parties, leading to their institutionalization. In this situation, a higher level of professionalization can be expected.

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