Over the past twenty odd years efforts have been made to redefine the scope of Southeast Asia as a whole, as well as to identity cultural areas within it. The most recent is Sun Laichen’s “Greater Southeast Asia” which extended as far north as the Yangzi River in the 2nd century BCE with a fluid boundary that has been shifting ever since. Attempting to overcome the Bangkok biased view of Thai history, scholars have turned their attention to the Tay residing inside and outside Thailand. This trend has spawned new conceptualizations of the multi-ethnic area covering Yunnan, Guangxi, Northern Continental Southeast Asia and Assam. The linguist Shintani Tadahiko has dubbed it the Tay Cultural Area and Hayashi Yukio and his colleagues have examined it from the perspective of Theravada Buddhism. Observing the use of a common script, Hans Penth has coined the term, “Culture of the Region of the Dhamma Letters.” These concepts are founded on historical and cultural criteria and try to encompass the wide linguistic and ethnic diversity prevailing there, and they aim to avoid the pitfalls of narratives promoted by modern Southeast nation states, which often reflect the views of single, or dominant, ethnic groups. One common feature of them is that they all assume close relationships and interactions between lowlanders and hill peoples. The general picture that emerges is one of hill peoples loosely governed by Tay rulers in a lord/vassal relationship, and while some, particularly Mon-Khmer speaking ethnic groups, adopted certain aspects of Tay culture (e.g. Buddhism, scripts etc), others shunned unnecessary contact with them. Besides that, we really know very little about the history of hill peoples due to the dearth of source materials and limited anthropological fieldwork.

In this context Scott’s book is refreshingly welcome because it aims to clarify the common historical experience of hill peoples vis-à-vis lowland regimes in general, an approach that hitherto has been sorely lacking. The author argues his case in a clear, comprehensible and erudite fashion leaving readers in little doubt as to where he stands. His basic thesis is that hill peoples deliberately chose a material life style (residential location, agricultural techniques, rejection of written scripts), ideology, and a flexible social organisation in order to defend themselves from the encroachments of lowlanders and avoid incorporation into the administrative systems of paddy states (his term for lowland states). Hill peoples embraced the ideals and aspirations of egalitarianism, freedom and independence, and it was only by designing and securing a mode of living and a social structure of “escape” that they could succeed in maintaining their cherished life styles. The author offers state evasion and state prevention as key concepts for rethinking past and present discourse on state formation in particular and civilisation theories in general. Striving to overcome historical views based on the nation state interpretation of history, he emphasises intentional statelessness as the reverse side to state formation by classical Kingdoms and their successor modern states in Southeast Asia.

1) Laichen [2010].
2) Shintani first advocated the concept in Ogon no Yonkaku Chitai: Shan Bunkaken no Rekishi Gengo Minzoku [1998]. A collection of articles has been published on northern Laos. See Shintani Tadahiko et al. [2009]. Hayashi Yukio edited a major collection of articles on Buddhism and Islam [2009].
3) Penth [1994: 13]
Barbarianism is defined as not acquiescing to administration by states, specifically the act of not paying taxes, so hill people favoured “self barbarianism” as a strategy for avoiding government control.

A whole range of questions readily come to mind. Are state evasion and state prevention viable concepts for understanding the history of hill peoples? Were these the only two factors defining their culture and social and political organisation? I find the author’s picture of the hill people’s history oversimplified and incongruent with the facts. Anarchy never reigned supreme in hill societies. While we may say that hill peoples did aspire to self autonomy and did prize independence from outsiders, it is equally true that they all maintained forms of social organisation to control their members; clans and villages laid down conventions and rules in the absence of leaders. Furthermore, there is a growing body of historical evidence indicating that some hill peoples did engage in polity building exercises, so the notion of government by leaders was more omnipresent and more widely accepted than the author surmises. Again, with agricultural techniques the point that shifting agriculture was a clever practice for tax evasion is perceptive as it is persuasive, but he is stretching the argument too far when he claims that they cultivated escape crops as a means of avoiding depredation from lowland officials. As far as I know the main crops were upland rice and other cereals, cultivars that could be easily appropriated by the state if the cultivators settled for a long period. In short, the logic is astoundingly circular; the conclusion drawn from every topic from agriculture to script always reverts back to state evasion and state prevention, revealing the ideological obsessions of the author rather than a desire to argue from historical evidence.

This comes as no surprise for the author confesses at the outset that he is enrolled in the “psychological warfare branch” of the Zomia army (p.14), and works for the noble cause of redressing the imbalance of past accounts which espouse the viewpoint of paddy states. That they have been neglected is undoubtedly true, but I find it disappointing that the author fails to address important issues already raised in the growing body of research. Previous studies have identified alienation of upland subjects from Tay overlords, conversion to Buddhism and Christianity, the relationship of the spread of these two great religions with indigenous animism, the prohibition of shifting agriculture, the integration of hill peoples into the world market, migration to cities to search for work (e.g. Thailand) and so forth, as major factors affecting the lives of hill peoples. The intricacy of the situation surrounding hill peoples defies reduction to a single factor such as state intervention.

The category hill people encompass an assortment of ethnic groups with different languages and cultures, and their history has been heavily shaped by outside influences. Therefore the task of clarifying the major factors that influenced change in their societies and grasping their common historical experience is certainly necessary. What I take issue with are some of the premises on which the author bases his argument. First, he misconstrues one aspect of the basic lowland/upland relationship. No one would ever be so rash as to deny the dichotomy between lowland and upland, or claim that there never was any armed conflict, or blood spilt. But to suggest that the sole concern of hill people was organising their lives to escape paddy states is far too one-dimensional. By arguing that only conflict prevailed he underplays the role of the symbiotic nature of lowland/upland relationships; the two groups were interdependent despite being antagonistic at times. Hill peoples supplied forest products to Tay either through tribute or trade, and the ubiquitous periodic mar-
kets facilitated the exchange of necessities for lowlanders as well as upland peoples. Loyal upland vassals provided troops and guides in times of emergency. In short, lowland regimes could not function without the cooperation of upland peoples, and we even know of cases where Tay mismanagement of hill peoples led to the confiscation of their upland territories by Chinese dynasties.4)

Second, to argue that hill tribes never aspired to building their own polities is simply unfounded. Historians of Northern Thailand, particularly Cholthira Satyawawdha and Aroonrut Wichienkeeo, have cited archaeological as well as documentary evidence from the post 17th century period to demonstrate that Lwa (Lwa, Lua, Wa; a Mon-Khmer group) polities existed prior to the foundation of the Lanna polity by the Tay.5) Chinese scholars maintain that Mon-Khmer speakers were indigenous to Southern Yunnan, and they have singled out the Wa, Plang and De’ang (Palaung) ethnic groups as the earliest inhabitants of the Yunnan/Burmese border region.6)

Chinese historical sources reveal clusters of Mon-Khmer power bases scattered over a wide area west of the Mekong (Lancang) River in Yunnan from the 13th to 16th centuries. The picture emerging then is one of Mon-Khmer polities based on shifting agriculture that wielded political power prior to the arrival of the Tay.7) Even when the author does refer to political organisations of hill peoples he avoids the issue of polity formation among them. In his discussion of the theocratic regime with five centres administered by Mahayana Buddhist monks that arose among the Lahu in the hills of southwest Yunnan, circa 1800 to 1887, the author concludes that Lahu prophets aimed “to resist subordination to valley states” (p. 291). Kataoka Tatsuki, who studied this case earlier than Scott, also arrived at a similar conclusion about the role of theocracy as an agent for maintaining political independence from the Qing dynasty and Tay regimes, but he also noted that the regime in effect constituted a multi-village polity.8) What we really need are insights into the organisation of hill people polities and the significance of their motives for state building activities. Unfortunately, this book remains frustratingly laconic about such urgent matters.

Third, the author often ignores the historical context of the sources that he brings to bear on the subject. Inadequate attention to this aspect has serious consequences for the creditability of his conclusions. He primarily relies on evidence from the reports of colonial officials and anthropological studies all of which describe society during the post 18th century period. The population explosion in China during the 18th century spawned large-scale Han Chinese migration to the highlands of southern Yunnan. Enlarged populations in the hills together with the expansion of commercial cotton and tea cultivation in the highlands of Southern Yunnan and Northern Burma resulted in a domino effect pattern of migration causing some ethnic groups to relocate further south in the hills of Burma, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam.9) In addition to the perennial encroachments of Chinese dynasties, paddy states, and later colonial regimes, hill peo—

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4) Daniels [2004] and Giersch [2006].
5) Satyawawdha [1997] and Wichienkeeo [2000].
6) Wazu Jianshi [1985].
8) Particularly see Kataoka [2007a: 93-96]. Also see Kataoka [2007b].
9) For commercial crops see Takeuchi [2010]. For Han migration see Nomoto and Nishikawa [2008].
ples now had to cope with increasing commercialisation and pressure on land. This was an era of turbulent change for upland societies, one in which conflicts between lowland and upland residents had become exacerbated by outside factors. Therefore we must pose the question, how valid is an argument based on data from this period for formulating a general theory about the material and ideological history of hill peoples over the long term?

Fourth, this book is certainly enriched by the accounts of slave maroon communities in America, but the reader is left wondering how this connects to the subject at hand. The social and political environment surrounding the lowland/upland relationship in continental Southeast Asia differed greatly from that of the plantation system in North America, so it is natural to wonder how legitimate the comparisons really are. The author frequently cites evidence out of context, providing no explanation about its relevance to the upland peoples of Zomia. For instance, the author’s argument for escape agriculture, a central component of the state evasion concept, is based on the supposedly deliberate cultivation of escape crops, a category that includes two new World cultivars, maize and cassava. Though the cultivation of maize on slope land did spread throughout Southwest China among the Han from the 18th century, it did not turn into a major subsistence crop in the hills of Continental Southeast Asia during the contemporary period. As for cassava, I find it a curious for a book in an “Agrarian Studies Series” that the author slips this American tuber into the argument as corroborative evidence (pp. 205–207) because, as far as I know, hill peoples have never grown it as a subsistence crop, before the mid-20th century at least.

Bearing in mind all of my serious reservations about the usefulness of Scott’s concepts for the intricate task of reconstructing the history of hill peoples in Southeast Asia, do I still recommend his book? The answer is definitely yes. It has made a significant contribution by highlighting egalitarianism and independence as the ideals of hill societies, for we can employ these as benchmarks for historical analysis at the macro-level. Cynics could contend that the new term Zomia (coined by William van Schendel) merely extends the reach of the already known lowland/upland dichotomy to India, and thereby downplays the impact of this neologism on the grounds that the author says very little about India and mainly draws on data from continental Southeast Asia and Southwest China. But I feel that by situating Zomia at the centre of the stage, and elucidating the values of its residents, the author forces us to face the fact that hill peoples did play a part in the history of Southeast Asia, a topic which historians have consistently ignored in the past. By challenging the current idea of borderlands as marginalised and deprived areas destined for incorporation into modern nation states and ultimate assimilation, Scott has provided us with a platform for rethinking ethnic identities and inter-ethnic relations.

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Wichienkeeo, Aroonrut. 2000. *Lawa (Lua): A Study from Palm-Leaf Manuscripts and Stone Inscriptions*. In *Dynamics of Ethnic Cultures Across National Boundaries in South-
One recalls that Partha Chaterjee (1986; 1993) lamented Anderson’s notion of modular and derivative character of nationalisms in the post-colonial world. “If nationalisms in the rest of the world”, Chaterjee wryly asked, “have to choose their imagined communities from certain ‘modular’ forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?” (1993: 5). The echoes of this trenchant question reverberated as I read Anthony Reid’s *Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia*. The way how this book is framed conjures up the spectre of doubt as to whether the field has moved far enough in the past two decades away from the spirit of this approach to nationalism.

The book consists of eight chapters. The first two chapters revisit some of the issues involved in understanding nationalism in Asia vis-à-vis the ‘West’ in general and nationalism in Southeast Asia in particular. The subsequent five chapters elucidate a range of fascinating cases including Chinese nationalisms in the region, Malay identity, Aceh, Batak and Kadazandusun. The last chapter provides a concise recapitulation of the book’s main arguments.

At the outset, *Imperial Alchemy* raises two questions about nationalisms in Asia that, in my mind, are supposed to set the direction of analysis: Are they following the trajectory of the development of nationalism in Europe, or, are they a ‘different beast’ altogether? The sense of ambivalence is noticeable. Noting that Asia’s experience of colonialism, among other things, had no parallel in Europe, there is thus, the need for a different typology for ‘Asian nationalism’, as follows: (1) ethnic nationalism; (2) state nationalism; (3) anti-imperial nationalism; and in a rather awkward manner he calls (4) outrage against state humiliation (OSH). With these categories, one gets the impression that ‘Asian nationalisms’ have been granted ontological status, as ‘different beasts’. The way the analysis unfolds, however, flags a contrarian view. Nationalisms in Southeast Asia turned out to be not ‘different beasts’ after all, but “magically” transformed derivatives of the Euro-American imperial experience.

The title says it all. Nicely capturing the main argument, it is claimed that through ‘imperial alchemy’ the “base metal of empire” was “transmuted into the gold of nationhood” (p. 3). That is, by some kind of political ‘magic’, the old polities—in their “ethnic, political and civilizational forms”—have been transformed to become independent modern nation-states harbouring various forms of nationalism.

One may argue that typologies of nationalism cannot be complete without taking on board what appears to be inherently *emic* aspects of the nationalist thoughts and experience, such as self-generated meanings (both collective and individual) of what nation, nationalism and nationalist experience are. In some fundamental sense, nation-formation and nationalism as its driving force are processes from within or, at first instance an insider’s discourses and experience. That the prime movers of nationalism often were Western-educated intelligentsia ought not to mislead us into supposing that they were outsiders. Rather, they ought to be seen as imagining and positioning themselves within, in fact as the vanguard of, a body politic that was in the making. Even granting that all nationalisms are...
a form of reaction to outside forces, imagined and/or real, it ought to be seen at the back of the eyeballs or felt underneath the skin of those who live through it. The reason is simple: analytic imperative demands that primary agency must be sought at the very least where the reaction (if indeed nationalism is just a reaction) is coming from, not in the source of the stimuli. Analysing nationalism, thus, entails allowing the conditions within the incipient nation an analytically privileged standpoint. This makes Michael Billig's [1995] notion of banal nationalism of fundamental importance, and this also explains why the proposed typology of 'Asian nationalisms' spelled out above appears inadequate.

One striking feature of this typology is its state-centric and elitist character. Even ethnie nationalism that, as one might expect, presupposes the central role of the common people in nation-formation seems in the book's formulation driven by, or framed within, the elitist and/or state-centric view of, and by, a particular ethnie. This is clear, among other instances, in the treatment of Batak in Chapter 6 where after emphasizing the textured experience of various groups under the rubric 'Batak' including those in diaspora, the analysis ended up reducing such complexity by tying 'Batakness' to the nation-state called Indonesia. More about this below.

Conceiving nationalism with the real people as a sidelined object rather than as a central subject of analysis, a limit has been set to the range of nationalisms in the region that the typology and analysis can cover. This enables the simplification of the otherwise very dynamic, multi-layered, continuing and competing processes of nation-formation, paving the way for the strikingly one-dimensional notion of 'imperial alchemy'.

That this alchemy works is clearly shown, so the book claims, by the resilience in the postcolonial period of the geo-body as defined by colonialism. It is also manifest in the form of a sort of Westphalian state-to-state relations that is valued highly within ASEAN. By taking this situation as if it is a historical given, rather than as historically contingent, the current nation-state boundary has been rendered as a necessary container that nationalism ought to fill in. Any nationalism that cannot—in fact or in intent—fill it up is regarded less than worthy of being considered true or rightful nationalism. The ease and lack of irony, for instance by which the Acehness who fought off the military in the 1950s as ‘rebels’ (p. 142) indicates the location of authority and the brand of nationalism considered as legitimate. Had the treatment been analytically fair, the term ‘freedom fighters’ might have been more appropriate and the situation ought to have been regarded as a struggle between two emerging body politics which happened to subscribe to two different, but possibly equally legitimate forms of nationalisms. Driven by the notion of ‘imperial alchemy’, Aceh’s ethnie nationalism could not but play second fiddle to state nationalism of the Jakarta-centered government. With a peace pact signed in 2005 and the parties closely connected to GAM emerging victorious in the elections for governorship in 2006, partiality could not be concealed when this development is described in these words: “The ethnie nationalism of Aceh . . . had come to terms with the state nationalism of Indonesia” (p. 143). Rather than taking Aceh’s nationalism on its own term, it is treated like a prodigal son returning for forgiveness and acceptance of his father.

By using the imperial-to-national geo-body transformation as the fulcrum of the development of nationalism, a closure to the otherwise open-ended processes of nation-formation has been unduly cast. This left analysis not much option but to downplay or ignore elements of nationalist imagination and experience that do
not satisfy the frame set by the imperial-turned-national geobody. By claiming for instance that “Indonesia and its imperial predecessor are the only form of state the Batak have known” and that “it is now also the only true nation-state they can readily imagine” (p. 186), the possibility of an alternative way of imagining Batakness, particularly that which is divorced from being a citizen of Indonesia, has been denied. One might be struck, for instance, by Reid’s richly textured mapping out of Batakness in Chapter 6—including that which is ‘performed’ by those in the diaspora—and yet he concludes with the pronouncement cited above. Rather than treating other forms of nationalisms such as banal nationalism, colonial nationalism, ‘performatif’ nationalism as possibly important constitutive elements of, or parallel to state, ethnie or OSH nationalisms, they were downplayed, if not ignored altogether. Moreover, a teleological explanation has been set underpinned by evolutionary logic that preset or presupposed the formation of the present form of the geobody-tied nationalism. Rendering the present as a fait accompli the persistence of the other forms of nationalisms is ignored and the question of their possible validity set aside.

The treatment in Chapter 4 of the long-standing Filipino claims to being Malay seems exemplary of the problem with imperial alchemy as a template for understanding nationalism in the region. It is claimed that it was through Blumentritt that early Filipino nationalists such as Rizal “became convinced” (p. 99) that Filipinos were Malay. Not only is this factually indefensible, for the Propagandists looked on many other European scholars whom they knew earlier than Blumentritt or whose work they had read earlier on. In addition, Pigafetta’s chronicle of the early 16th century points to much earlier and ‘indigenous’ roots of this idea. What is truly disturbing is the implication of this claim: that is, that Filipino nationalists such as Rizal and others, brilliant as they may have been, couldn’t learn or imbibe something except through the initiative and/or assistance of a European. One wonders what is this mentality that makes it difficult to recognize the sentiments or knowledge of ‘natives’ as their own, and not something that the Euro-Americans had put inside their hearts and minds? It tempts one to ask if the imperial alchemy that the book refers to is not really about nation-formation, but about the avatars of colonial scholarship that persist to this day.

The abovementioned problems notwithstanding, the book is a valuable addition to the growing body of work on nationalism in South-east Asia. De-coupled from the book’s problematic conceptual anchor of ‘imperial alchemy’, the five case studies offer perceptive and fascinating, if on occasions debatable, interpretations, analysis and synthesis of an impressively wide range of data. Notable for their comparative intent, penetrating insights and synthetic ambition, they offer a nuanced and fluid portrait of nation-formation. Through contrapuntal reading, as what I have tried to do, the wide ranging cases built up in the book could be shown to subvert rather than support the notion of imperial alchemy. If alchemy was indeed accomplished, these case studies demonstrate that it was not so much by the imperial but by the nationalists. After all, they are not called nationalists for nothing.

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References

According to the editors of this collection of essays, this is probably the first book in English with the words “Asian” and “Populism” together in its title. The volume begins with a compact and well written introduction by the editors followed by an engaging article by Matsushita Hiroshi on the evolution of populism in Latin America called the “treasure house” of populisms. Matsushita’s article demonstrates not only the resemblances between Asian and Latin American "populisms" but also their inevitable divergences. Recent Asian “populisms” seem to reflect a closer affinity with Fujimori’s “neoliberal populism” than with the subsequent wave of socialist and leftist populisms currently sweeping Latin America exemplified by Hugo Chavez’s rise to power. The general consensus in the book is that the processes of economic globalisation and political democratization leading up to the Asian economic crisis of 1997 led to an erosion of legitimacy among the traditional elites which in turn opened the way for various types of populism to surface.

The book presents the rise and fall of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as the paradigmatic case of "Asian populism." An article co-written by Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker grounds their narrative of Thaksin’s rise and fall on their analysis of the social and class basis of contemporary Thai populism. They convincingly argue that Thaksin’s appeal lay mainly among the great numbers of people working in the agricultural and urban informal sector. This essay together with Tamada Yoshifumi’s study on the irreversible changes wrought by political democratisation and globalisation on Thai society probably represents the core of the book as a whole. Continuing the series of studies on Thaksin, Nualnai Treerat gives a very compelling survey of Thaksin’s use of the media and how his attempts at gradually increasing his monopolistic control over these eventually contributed in a crucial way to his downfall.

The other Asian leader sharing the most similarities to Thaksin is probably Joseph Estrada of the Philippines. Both Estrada and Thaksin are relative outsiders to the traditional ruling oligarchies of their respective nations. Estrada used his popularity as a movie actor as political capital while Thaksin developed an increasingly sophisticated and creative use of media as a propaganda tool. However, there are also very significant differences between the two. Upon gaining office, Thaksin began to implement programs aimed at consolidating his popularity among his rural base. Thaksin was able to meet certain expectations among the rural poor with his unprecedented programs for universal health care, agrarian debt relief and accessible loans. By appropriating for himself certain roles which overlapped with the functions and prerogatives of the monarchy, Thaksin was increasingly felt to be a threat to the latter’s fundamental role in Thai politics. In contrast to Thaksin’s relatively effective albeit limited programs, Estrada’s pro-poor image was a complete myth. Too eager to win the support of the US and to gain the confidence of the business community, Estrada quickly delegated all policy matters to his advisers and technocratic staff and went passively along with the neoliberal agenda without exhibiting any exertion of creativity or the slightest independence of mind on all major policy issues.
However, authors Tamada and Rocamora would probably agree that both leaders did not pose any serious structural challenge to the “established elites” of their respective nations. They instead represent a type of “democratisation” which made these traditional elites uneasy, perhaps only until they too are able to master, control and limit the new techniques for winning electoral power. Like Thaksin, Estrada lacked the solid mass organisations of classical populism and depended on the media for projecting himself as a personal leader among the people. Lacking a social base ready to be mobilised to defend them when threatened, they were thus rendered extremely vulnerable when their leadership faced powerful challenges. Estrada’s downfall was probably not because any of the existing oligarchs felt that their position in Philippine society was being seriously threatened by him in the immediate or even in the long-term, but simply because Estrada had left himself vulnerable to attacks from the other factions of the ruling elites scrambling for power. Everyone knows that there is nothing new about rampant corruption in the Philippines. What is new is how Estrada flaunted his wealth and legendary extravagances. Using the banner of “clean government,” other factions of the oligarchy could mobilize their own middle class constituencies, branches of government, Church people and the military against Estrada to regain power for themselves. Politics is a cutthroat affair in the Philippines. However, the most recent election (2010) in which Estrada came second in the presidential race shows that for a large segment of Philippine voters, the image of their hero has faded but little.

Rocamora’s main proposition that “populists succeed when they are able to bridge the discursive gulf between the westernized elite and poor people” may be more specific to the Philippines than he realizes. This former US colony is after all the country where class divisions are much more visible linguistically and culturally than perhaps any other country in Southeast Asia. Such an almost seamless transformation accomplished by Thaksin from being a savvy billionaire businessman quoting Bill Gates to a “man of the people” embraced by thousands in Thailand is much harder to conceive of in the Philippine context. Benedict Anderson’s afterword rightly stresses the culturally specific nature of populist practices.

Boo Teik Khoo’s article compares Mahathir and Thaksin by sketching a broader political economic and ideological context points to a longer tradition of populism in Asia. However valuable this may be in giving a longer view of the populist phenomenon in Southeast Asia, it seems to dilute the sharpness of vision necessary to understand the “novelty” of Thaksin and Estrada. Deft and durable statesman that he is, Mahathir seems to ultimately belong to another political era which bear the stamp of “populisms” of the type of leaders like Marcos and Suharto. Okamoto’s article rightly makes the observation that the term “populism” does not apply to national leaders such as Megawati or SBY and therefore shifts the discussion to a brilliant account of the rise of local “populist” leaders such as Fadel Mohammed from the province of Gorontalo in Sulawesi. Okamoto’s article points to the importance of a local perspective in studying the development of this new type of populism.

The remaining articles on South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are relatively more disparate and diffuse but they all point to the decline of party legitimacy and the rise of individual leaders. Kimura Kan writes about South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s “obsolete [leftist] nationalism” failing in the face of a resurgent “developmentalism.” Taiwan President’s Chen Shui-Bian’s tenure in power was discussed by Matsumoto Mitsutoyo under the rubric of “nationalist popu-
lism” which also collapsed mainly due to US pressure to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan straits. Otake Hideo makes a careful and instructive comparison of the neoliberal populisms of Reagan and Koizumi.

The sharpness of focus and definition which Thaksin’s example of a new type of Asian neoliberal populism provides the book is not very evenly maintained throughout the book. The book itself, despite the attempts of the various articles to analytically capture the slippery concept of populism, mirrors the very difficulty of coming to grips with it. Nevertheless, the book provides useful conceptual tools in understanding and confronting contemporary political phenomena in Asia, more specifically, Southeast Asia. It is truly an academic event which heralds an innovative way of looking at political events in Asia.

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With The Appearance of Memory, Kusno brings the notion of “physical space and spatial images” (p. 4) into the discussion of the twin subjects of nation and modernity that have dominated literary studies and criticism. Fluent in the key vocabularies of postcolonial studies (e.g. “negotiation,” “contestation,” “register/registering”), Kusno draws on architecture in Jakarta to make a case for “how building and urban space engage in defining (as well as contesting) the sense of fragmentation, collective memories, new forms of governmentality and different hopes for the future” (p. 20). This is an important contribution to scholarship, a timely reminder of the limitations of focusing exclusively on written or printed texts and the necessity of attending to other dimensions such as urban form in historical and contemporary studies.

The significance of the urban form as a unit of analysis is that, as Kusno skillfully demonstrates in the first section of the book (Chapter 1, 2, 3), it flattens all social actors, “(t)he state, the city government, professionals, religious elites, ethnic groups, nationalists, and neo-liberal” (p. 9), placing these agents in the same terrain so as to enable readers to discern how each pursues his or her own dreams and interests, and seeks to shape urban space in accordance with these dreams and interests. In Chapter 1, Kusno introduces the concept of “the looseness at the center” to describe a neoliberal democratic Indonesia whose city government in Jakarta is losing authority over society; the chapter highlights the mushrooming of the street vendors and their resistances in the usage of urban spaces. Chapter 2 looks at the city government’s attempts to reclaim authority through the “busway project” in order to discipline the masses and regain legitimacy by pursuing typical middle-class agendas. The middle-class taste for architecture, described in Chapter 3, is exemplified by the preference for multifunctional “superblocks” that encourage market consumption, even as talented architects have sought, in the so-called “architecture of the kampung,” an alternative concept in middle-class housing in Jakarta. Kusno’s portrait of the city is a nuanced account of recognition, denial and contradiction, rather than a simple narrative of domination of one group over the others. In this, the book departs from previous studies of the urban form in Southeast Asia that emphasize the marginalization of the weak [for example, Goh 2002], or the celebration of the future [King 2008], or the worship of the capital [Bishop et al. 2004], even as it places Jakarta in a comparative map of the postcolonial/developing/urban Asian city.
Kusno asserts that “architecture and urban space as concrete social artifacts” (p.14) are grounded in “the everyday built environment” (p.104) that lends itself to “a longue durée analysis...[so that] we see the appearance of various forms of the past that still produce more or less visible manifestation as they pass through different social formations and power relations” (p. 19). This could be an interesting and important “method” for investigating the question of “national identity” that has haunted the nation-modernity discussion. But strangely, Kusno’s analysis does not offer a strong validation of this argument.

Take for example Chapter 4, in which he discusses Glodok as “a key Chinese business district” (p.10) without presenting any data on its specific activities and volume of business. Since the 1990s, the functions of Glodok as a business district have become territorially dispersed with the rise of “new” (Chinese-run) business districts in and around Jakarta. Richard Robison [1986] has demonstrated that economic growth under Suharto in the 1980s had created a condition in which Chinese capital accumulation had achieved a large enough scale to become mobile and transnational [on the 1990s, see Winters 1996]. East Asian regional economic integration of the 1990s would enhance this mobility. Moreover, the small and medium-sized businesses (e.g., retailers, importers, manufacturing firms) had aggregated supply and demand for domestic market consumption on a scale that led to the development of the Mangga Dua, and Sunter—Kelapa Gading areas as business districts in their own right. In other words, even before the 1998 riots, there was already a visible trend toward the expansion of the Chinese business, expansion that enabled many of these businesses to move out of Glodok in both domestic and international terms. And even if the destruction and violence of May 1998 riots had been concentrated in the Glodok area (a claim disputed by other reports), the victims were not limited to ethnic Chinese and shop-owners. From a political point of view, the irony of the riots is that they not only victimized non-Chinese and common people who were not shop-owners; they imagined Glodok as “center” of Chinese business when that was clearly no longer the case. In addition, Ariel Heryanto (1998) has argued that the sexual violence in 1998 cannot be perceived mainly as racial violence against the Chinese but should first be considered as an act of violence against women. By making Glodok synonymous with business activity and with the ethnic Chinese, Kusno’s analysis risks essentializing the Chinese while overlooking important changes in the urban form of Chinese business already underway even before the riots.

Another example is the analysis in Chapter 8, in which Kusno makes the case for a “Global Islam” and the architecture of mosques, but evidently neglects the histories of the strong influence of other foreign elements (besides Arab merchants and Chinese carpenters) and of regional commerce in early maritime Asia on the “visual environment” of the Demak Mosque.1 The term “Global Islam” might have a certain catchiness in the present, but its use downplays the specific history of the spread of Islam into Southeast Asia in the past, when the key agents were not merely Arabs and the spread was enabled largely by maritime trade that shaped the institutions and spatial arrangements in Southeast Asia, rather than state-sponsored and non-official educational programs as we have witnessed in present times.2 Thus, although Kusno

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1) On the “visual environment” of the Demak Mosque and Kudus Minaret through the lens of the attached tiles, see Sakai (2009).
2) See for example Milner (1983) on the concept of “Perfect Man”: “The good ruler/
claims to apply “longue durée analysis” to his discussion in Chapter 8, readers might be disappointed to find only a “thin description” of the process of religious continuity and change, if not a mere juxtaposition of the two notions of “the past” and “the present.”

In addition to that, Kusno’s treatment of “physical space and spatial images” is rather arbitrary and sometimes conflicting. On the analysis of “architecture of the kampung,” Kusno contends that the housing style is designed for the urban middle class, but also notes that Adi “Mamo” Purnomo, the architect in subject, did participate in a “design competition for low-class housing…for the urban poor located under a freeway and along the riverside” (p. 78). In fact, in the Introduction (“Dari Jendela Praktek: Catatan Pembuka”) to his book Relativitas, Mamo pokes fun at the architectural style and lifestyle of his contemporaries, the “major label” architects whose offices are (or who aspire to have offices) in numerous skyscrapers in urban Jakarta, by publishing a photograph showing the view from the window of his studio and noting that “what can be seen are none other than neighbors’ roofs that are jumbled together and pretty shabby. In the distance are lined high-class apartment buildings” [2005: 10]. Pigeonholing Mamo as an architect of the middle-class might underplay the fact that Mamo, with his double-vision of the middle-class and urban poor, has taken up some of the contemporary challenges of reconstructing urban space, as has been attempted in many postcolonial urban cities in Asia and Latin America. In fact, Mamo articulates the “universal wisdom” that housing design in the developing countries cannot be understood apart from the nature of the state and the power of capital to select some memories while erasing others.3)

A comparative perspective cognizant of similar efforts at urban reconfiguration in other cities might have enriched Kusno’s interpretation of the busway project in Jakarta. Kusno states that “(t)he busway shelters are an exact replica of those in Bogota (from where Sutiyoso got the idea), but the form seems to fit well with the surrounding city-scape of Jakarta” (p. 62). This natural “fit,” however, belies the complexity of the issue. Readers might get the impression that “the physical space and spatial images” envisioned and realized by the busway project are a perfect expression of Indonesian governmentality, but the busway concept’s foreign origins in other postcolonial urban cities in Asia and Latin America suggest as well the existence of global prescriptions for the problem of urban congestion. A more rigorous comparison of busway projects in different postcolonial cities might have led to a more nuanced understanding of the “urban pedagogy” of the busway project, which is not merely concerned with regulating and disciplining the movements and behavior of the urban poor, but encodes “metropolitan dreams” of modernizing the city (and population) of Jakarta to place it on a par with other urban cities of the world. Filipina critic Neferti Tadiar’s

3) See for example Irazábal, especially chapter 6: “Gated communities and edge cities as the localizing of global urban design traditions are thus new forms of space production involving very large, often multinational private project ventures in very dynamic real estate markets. Similarly, they represent new form of space consumption for the aforementioned elite” [2005: 214].
study [2004] on Manila’s “flyovers,” for example, reveals the extent to which the “desire” to control the flows of human and vehicular traffic was conceptualized and expressed through the metaphor of the body.  

Lastly, in the analysis of Glodok, Kusno claims to differ from “scholars in cultural studies” (p. 103) by focusing on “objects that were not built for a commemorative purposes but which are equally significant in registering, as well as forgetting, memories of past events” (p. 104). However, his analysis in fact focuses on three “landmarks” of the area, Glodok Plaza, Pasar Glodok, and the Chandra Naya building, with little discussion of the surrounding area that actually determines the dynamics of “physical and spatial images” in Glodok.

This review is not meant to nitpick, but to stimulate further research by drawing on The Appearance of Memory’s cogent proposal to treat “architecture and urban space as concrete social artifacts.” Kusno’s pioneering efforts amply demonstrate that a fresh understanding can be promoted, but not in a way that would sacrifice the concrete particulars of history and the present.

A note on the Indonesian translation. Along with chapter 4 of Kusno’s first book Behind the Postcolonial, four chapters of Appearance of Memory (chapters 1, 2, 3, 4) were translated into Indonesian and published under the title Ruang Publik, Identitas dan Memori Kolektif: Jakarta Pasca-Suharto (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2009). Kusno provides a different introduction for the Indonesian readers by posing the issue of the intricate relationship between the representation of public space (ruang publik) and collective memory (memori kolektif). Less riddled by academic jargon, the introduction poses little “theoretical” questions that make the whole discussion much easier to follow and absorb. By establishing a local context for its importance, the introduction tries to engage in conversation with concerned Indonesian readers in their mutual search to give meaning to the changes that have been happening in their cities (and also, what have been missing from them) over the last ten years since Reformasi (pasfareformasi). In that way, it offers fresh insights for interrogating the way Jakarta, the focus of the book, has been dreamed of, memorialized, represented and, in actual fact, constructed. However, the translation is poorly done, with some inaccuracies that lead to alterations in meaning.

4) Tadiar writes in her chapter, “Metropolitan Dreams”: “On the occasion of Manila’s 422nd anniversary, Mayor Lim promises his constituency, ‘We shall clear up the streets and unclogs the thoroughfares to allow the city to breathe again—and let the lifeblood of its commerce flow freely once more to give life to our city’. What Lim articulates, for which he has become immensely popular among the middle and upper classes, is a desire for what Sigfried Giedion views as ‘the fundamental law of parkway—that there must be unobstructed freedom of movement, a flow of traffic maintained evenly at all points without interruption or interference’” [2004: 89].

5) For examples: “Toward the middle of the 1990s” (p. 28) is translated as “Pada awal 1990-an” (p. 100), which is more accurately as “Sampai pertengahan tahun 1990-an”; “an enclosure and a space of retreat (p. 86) is loosely translated as “pamer kemewahan dan berburu ketenangan” (p.176); “the narrative construction constitutes a temporal response” (p.104) is arbitrary translated as “sebuah konstruksi temporal” (p. 72). Some words/sentence are also omitted in the translation: one important sentence (p. 87, line 2-8) which compares the past and the present is omitted from the translation on p.177; the key adjective “cultur-”
might make for difficult reading in Indonesia, and risks ending up as just another example of a failed attempt by a “native” to import “foreign” ideas and regulate “natives’” understanding of things, with little relevance to their survival in the city.

(Jafar Suryomenggolo • CSEAS)

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Reading this book, I have, at least, the following expectations: which ecological aspects of the Mekong river basin are examined, what is the present situation of its ecology, and how and why have those aspects managed to change or remain unchanged in the decades following the Second World War?

To answer these expectations, the authors deal firstly with the preconditions for the survival of the people mainly in the Mekong river basin, that is, in order to survive, the people have to interact with nature and their man-made or man-influenced environments, including adaptation to their environments. By interaction, what is meant is that the environments influence the people and vice versa with people’s survival contingent on their use or management of natural resources available in the environments. Those natural resources primarily include plants, animals, fungi, and water for food, clothing, shelters and communications.
The authors do examine the plants and their products. They pay special attention to the forests, the most important natural resources, including primary monsoon forests, secondary forests, rice-producing forests, water conservation forests, bamboo groves as well as teak and rubber plantations. In the Monsoon Forests of Part 1, Kono Yasuyuki’s evaluation of the monsoon forests is that they provide the flora and fauna upon which the people’s livelihood depends. He describes the various types of people’s interactions with the forests, for example, how they protect them in order to collect building materials and fuel (p. 3). The four kinds of mutualism in the tropical monsoon forests are worth reading for the description of the ecology of the Mekong river basin.

However, what is of most interest is people’s interaction with forests through practices such as swidden farming. Also in the Monsoon Forests of Part 1, Kono argues that single cropping is conducted through swidden, and secondary forests are regenerated in the fallow period, providing forest products, including food, medicines, and materials for clothing and commodities. He claims that swidden farming in the forests is one of the most outstanding and successful complimentary interactions established between humans and forests (p. 2), and the alleged role of swidden agriculture in deforestation is limited (p. 4). And, as Yamada Isamu puts it in the introduction of the book, if the rotation interval is well managed, swidden is the most sustainable farming method in the regions (p. xxvii). In the Secondary Forests of Part 1, Takeda Shinya and his Lao co-author Anoulom Vilayphone closely look at fallow or secondary forests in swidden, believing most of the remaining forests in the Mekong river basin to be secondary forests consisting primarily of bamboo, where the regenerative process of secondary forests is repeated. These kind of forests provides many forest products, namely, grass plants and shrubs, such as cardamom, rattan, and alpinia. They also note the changes in swidden in Laos, where the Lao government is promoting the intensification of land use through the Land Allocation Program for stabilizing swidden, thus decreasing land available for the practice. The Khmu people grow tea and eaglewood in the secondary forests (guided by Takeda I did observe the eaglewood plantation in Luang Prabang in our fieldwork trip for Prof. Kobayashi Shigeo’s tropical forest rehabilitation project in 2008). This practice may be a means of employing the knowledge of mountain people. In the Land of Part 1, Shaoting Yin’s description of the history of swidden agriculture in China’s Yunnan is a full and perfect account of how swidden has decreased due to five factors: swidden perceived as an old method, political laws limiting or prohibiting it, the national government’s social reform, population growth, and the commercial market economy that drives some swiddeners to abandon the practice and start growing fruit, tea, and rubber for the markets. Books of the same interest of swidden can be consulted, such as Agricultural Involution [Geertz 1963: 15–28] and Swidden Cultivation in Asia [Sachchidananda et al. 1983]. In the end, a flowchart demonstrates the eco-history of swidden agriculture. This method of ecology, changes and causes, as well as possible solutions, is followed in describing the eco-history of other forests, plants, animals, land, water, crafts, diet and health as well as regional eco-history. Of personal interest is Kosaka Yasuyuki’s introduction of rice-producing forests in the Forests of Part 1, which is yet another case of people’s interaction with forests typical of the Mekong river basin, and brings to mind the book Farmers in the Forest [Kunstadter et al. 1978].

By including accounts of the interaction between the Mekong river peoples and their
environments, this book sets itself apart from other writings on general ecology which are concerned simply with the interactions between organisms and their physical, chemical and biological environments. For example, some of the authors pay special attention to people's food and health, which put people first, a very unique addition to the ecological description of a region in a historical context. This may be thought of as a new direction in writing ecology or eco-history towards human ecology. The book provides a comparison with the environmental history developed by Roderick Nash [Nash 1970: 349–361; 1972], Donald Worster [1984; 1988; 1990], William Cronon [1983; 1990; 1992; 1993], and Richard White [1985].

For another example, in the foreword of Part 2, Moji Kazuhiko et al. point out that human ecology in the Mekong river basin is undergoing four transitions: a demographic transition that has brought about a decrease in the mortality rate with many people living to old age (the average life expectancy extended from 37.82 years in 1950 to 58.23 years in 2005); a childbearing female population increase and birth rate decline; a health transition that has given rise to the decline of mortality rate from acute infectious disease and increase in lifestyle-related diseases such as diabetes and cancer as well as mental illness; and a nutritional transition that has brought about “change from a small lean physique formed by hard physical labour and inadequate nutrition to a large and sometimes obese physique associated with the improvement of dietary and nutritional status, an urban lifestyle, and the promotion of growth during childhood” (p. 87). The authors are right in saying that the original diversity of the diet of glutinous rice, raw fish and crabs, fermented foods, seared meat, distilled spirits and edibles such as bamboo shoots and mushrooms are experiencing “equalization and complication,” (p. 87) because of the introduction of various foodstuffs. There are less species of glutinous rice, less food from forests and rivers, and more food purchased. Nutritional environmental changes refer to more rice, the loss of animals and plants, and imported food including snacks, instant noodles, and junk food that are rich in fat and salt and contain less micronutrients such as vitamins and minerals. The important reasons for the changes in the food environment are less arable land caused by deforestation, the mechanization of agriculture, the introduction of irrigation, polarization, and market economy. To my knowledge, the most immediate reason for the ecological disorders in the human body is an unbalanced diet, that is, an imbalance in the trinity of carbohydrate, fat and protein, the most basic intake for the human body. The authors offer some typical facts: more glutinous rice, more diabetes, more obesity. They also point out cases of depression among the elderly and the effect of human migration on the ecology. Interestingly, similar food diseases are can also be found here in Yunnan, China. For instance, Laap (minced beef, water buffalo, and pork) is similar to the raw pork popular among the Han and Dai natives in Xishuangbanna, Dehong, Baoshan and Nuijiang, which is responsible for incidences of trichinosis (or trichinellosis).

As Akimichi Tomoya puts it in the foreword of Part 3, the last part of the book, aims “to look into the history of resource management and governance,” and “proposes a comprehensive exploration of the eco-history of the monsoonal Asia” (p. 129). This can also be read as a way of writing an eco-history, that is, “to move from individual instances to general theories using a proxy method in measuring changes in resource management” (p. 129). Kono states that eco-history “describes the transforming interaction between people’s livelihoods and their environment” (p. 171). I believe the evolution of cross-
border management of resources is one part of the regional eco-history in the Mekong river basin. The authors provide a brilliant picture of how the resource management has changed and why. These cases include Nagatani Chiyoko’s introduction to rubber (pp. 129–131), Masuda Atsushi’s chapter on the spread of tea (pp. 135–138), Abe Kenichi on the collection of natural resin and forest conservation (pp. 139–141), Akimichi on fish conservation (pp. 141–143), Takeda on opium poppy (pp. 143–145), Sato Yo-Ichiro on corn (pp. 154–155) and Thongvanh Thepkayson on water buffalo and rubber plantations (pp. 168–170), etc.

I think the most comprehensive fact of the book, as Christian Daniels and Nomoto Takashi state in their chapter on the traditional management of natural resources and economic development in Part 3, is that “the understanding and cooperation of each individual is essential for maintaining a balance between human activity and ecological systems,” (p. 155) which I do hope refers to resource management. They continue to believe that “human activity invariably causes change in the ecological environment; however, we still have not arrived at an optimum balance between the two... The eternal problem is how to make humans realize that their well-being is contingent upon nature’s bounty” (p. 158). In the introduction of the present book, Abe describes the changing world of the Mekong river basin and identifies the reasons for these changes: the Second Indochina War and market economy. To cope with the ecological problems, Kono offers solutions to the problem: (1) there is a need to achieve “co-existence with the ecosystem using local people’s wisdom and technologies”; and (2) the “indigenous knowledge and technology empirically developed by people in mountainous regions provide another important message regarding resource management,” (p. 174) e.g. the swidden system, the multiple land use achieved by the cyclic approach to resource management.

The book, a page-turner, can be used as an encyclopedia, a helping hand with texts, maps, figures, tables and plates about the Mekong river basin’s ecological history. However, some corrections are necessary. The title of the book is about the ecology of the Mekong River basin, yet the parts of the Mekong river basin that are located in Qinghai and Tibet are not included in the book, while the basins of Honghe (Red) river, Pearl river, Nujiang (Salween) river and Yarze river are presented. If the authors do value these facts, the book could be better entitled An Eco-history of Tropical Monsoonal Asia.

Akimichi writes in the book that the Mekong river originates from the Tibetan Plateau (p. 35), and Anoulom Vilayphone and Takeda also affirm this (p. 5). However, the river actually originates from Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. Akimichi thinks that the whole length of the Mekong river is 6,500 km (p. 35), but usually it is thought to be 4,880 km; Doi Inthanon in Chiang Mai in northern part of Thailand should not be considered as part of the Mekong river basin in the context of this book. Kashinaga states that Dien Bien is one of Vietnam’s provinces (p. 83). It indeed is one of the districts of Lai Chou province in northwest Vietnam, not part of the Mekong river basin, and its full name is Dien Bien Phu.

Two recommendations can be made here: the land referred to in Part 1 of the book (p. 16) should be qualified as farming or agricultural land, for land is too broad a term covering all natural resources, such as forests, water and animals, and the water mentioned on p. 35 should be “the use of water.” Yet, some unanswered questions remain: what has become of the changes in the habitats of elephants, bears and monkeys and other wild animals, the ecological effect of eucalyptus (together with rubber trees), the
present situation of wild rice, *Taxus Chinensis* (Pilger) Rehd, exotic plants (tobacco, potato, etc) and animals (such as the snails that eat rice) in Yunnan, China? Furthermore, what has become of the ecological changes in the wetlands of Tonle Sap in Cambodia and the Mekong delta in south Vietnam, for instance, the mangroves at the mouth of the Mekong river to South China Sea; as well as the ecological effects of dams on the mouth of the Mekong river to South China in south Vietnam, for instance, the mangroves at the mouth of the Mekong river? An in-depth quantitative analysis is still required to answer these questions. (Chen Jianming • Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming, Yunnan, China)

References


The Jomon and Yayoi Periods roughly correspond to prehistoric times in the Japanese Archipelago. Owing to geographical propinquity, East Asia and Southern Siberia have been considered to be main areas which mixed genes and cultures with the Japanese Archipelago. In this book, Ann Kumar tries to extend this gene-culture pool to Southeast Asia, especially Java. Considering the general feature of this book, the first word in the title may be somewhat overstated. Yet, as a person familiar with Murayama Shichiro’s works on Austronesian influences on Japanese language, I praise the author’s effort to combine linguistic, archeological, skeletal, and genetic data on the origins of the Yayoi period on the Japanese Archipelago.

This book consists of three parts. From the beginning of Part I, readers are dragged into an
interesting hypothesis that Indonesian and Japanese cultures have clear similarities. Although some of them, such as rice classification, may be a suitable starter for the book, I was puzzled by the relatively long discussion on horse marks. This kind of cultural similarity has been apparent in historical times, since the cultural connection between Japan and Southeast Asia is well documented from the Sixteenth Century. I am afraid that some readers who are interested in prehistory may stop reading this book when they come across horses figures on pages 16 and 17. However, patience is rewarded by a reasonable description of Japanese and Indonesian prehistories in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, the author seems to not be familiar with the recent claims that the Yayoi period began in 3000 BP [Harunari and Imamura 2004], contrary to the traditional view of 2500 BP [Imamura 1996]. This is understandable, because Japanese researchers of Japanese archeology rarely write papers in English. In any case, if this new scheme is acceptable, the time frames of the Jomon-Yayoi succession presented in this book need modification. Five hundred years, or 20 human generations, are not short. This time shift may affect some of the author’s arguments in this book.

Part II is the core of this book. Four chapters are devoted to rice, bones, DNA, and languages. Some papers in which I was involved were cited in Chapter 5, and this may be one of the main reasons why I was asked to review this book. As my background is in anthropology, I have been interested not only in the genetic relationships of human populations but also in linguistic and skeletal data. My knowledge is limited, but I would like to comment on each chapter in Part II.

Chapter 3 deals with rice. The history of rice cultivation research is long, and there have been dramatic changes during the last 20 years with the use of new DNA technologies. Unfortunately, the author failed to mention these new studies, although some recent papers are fragmentarily cited. For example, Sato Yoichiro [1992] demonstrated a close relationship between temperate and tropic zone japonica, the latter also known as javanica. Yet, Sato himself considered that it came to Japan via Taiwan or possibly the Philippines, not directly from Indonesia. It is strange that the author never paid attention to Sato’s work, although she cited earlier works by Oka Hikoichi, with whom Sato studied rice when they were in the same department at the National Institute of Genetics, where I am now.

Another important paper on rice pylogeny is Xu et al. [2007]. The phylogenetic tree shown in that paper clearly demonstrates a close affinity between temperate and tropic zone japonica, though their ancestor seems to differ from Oryza rufipogon (nitra) in China. It should also be noted that javanica (tropical zone japonica) strains are closer to temperate zone japonica (japonica currently dominant in the Japanese Archipelago) and are from China, not Indonesia. This finding, using 49 SINE insertion polymorphic loci, should be considered in any discussion of the genetic relationships of rice.

Chapter 4 leads onto a discussion on human teeth and skulls. Many Japanese researchers, in particular the late Hanihara Kazuro, cited in this chapter are familiar to me. As I personally believe that nonmetric cranial traits are more suitable than metric traits for the phylogenetic study of human populations, I searched the website of Anthropological Science, the official journal of the Anthropological Society of Nippon. I found two papers of interest at this website; Shigematsu et al. [2004] and Fukumine et al. [2006]. In both papers, Japanese populations were compared with many surrounding human populations including those in South East Asia. Their results confirmed the author’s point that the Yayoi people were close to South East Asians, though
this pattern is different from the late Hanihara’s [1991] view on his dual structure hypothesis.

Chapter 5 is about DNA. The author nicely summarizes research results up to 2004, including her own paper. It seems this chapter was written in 2005 and no revisions were made before this book was published in 2009. During the last four years, an amazing amount of data has been produced thanks to a vast array of Genome Wide Association Studies. Li et al. [2008] compared 650,000 SNP loci for 51 human populations. Japanese were clustered with Han Chinese in their phylogenetic tree. Tian et al. [2008] compared 200,000 SNP loci for 22 mostly Asian populations. Although Indonesian populations were not used, Filipinos, Vietnamese, and Cambodians were included in this paper, as well as Japanese. Their PCA plot shows that Koreans are closest to Japanese, consistent with their geographical locations. Microsatellite DNA polymorphism is also often used for population comparison. Li et al. [2006] examined 105 microsatellite DNA loci for nine human populations mainly from East Asia, and found that Japanese were closest to Southern Chinese rather than Northern Chinese. This southern connection is interesting and as such the author should have paid more attention to these recent papers before publishing this book. Although published after this book came out, HUGO Pan-Asian SNP Consortium’s [2009] effort should also be mentioned in this book review.

Chapter 6 is about languages. I am not a specialist of linguistics, so I asked the professional linguist, Dr. Onishi Masayuki at the Research Institute for Humanity and Nature. He worked with the author when he was in Australia, and was one of the people acknowledged in this book. Accommodating his opinion, I would like to mention that the author’s analysis is sound and that similarities between Japanese and Javanese languages exist through borrowing from Old Japanese to Old Japanese. Nevertheless, I still have reservations about accepting a direct connection between the two languages, because geographically the Japanese Archipelago and the Sunda Archipelago are rather remote. It may be possible to hypothesize that some missing link, such as the northern Philippines or Taiwan or Southern China culturally connected these two Archipelagoes. This connection is certainly more acceptable than the Tamil-Japan connection hypothesis, almost dead now after almost its sole proponent passed away two years ago.

Part III of this book is not easy to cover for me. I therefore omit this part from my review.

Although I have offered various criticisms of this book, I agree with the author that the prehistory of the Japanese Archipelago should be viewed not only from East Asia (and Southern Siberia) but also from a more geographically broad perspective, including South East Asia. Hunter-gatherers travel over much larger distances than farmers. We have to be prepared to confront unexpected connections with places located far from the Japanese Archipelago.

(Saito Naruya Division of Population Genetics, National Institute of Genetics)

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HUGO Pan-Asian SNP Consortium. 2009. Mapp...

本書の狙い

本書が想定している読者層は、学部1年生から先端の研究者までであり、それらの者が上記各国の法を調査・研究する際の導入および一次資料へのアクセス方法提示に狙っている。

本書の構成

本書は、序章、全14章の各国紹介、付録、と大きく分けて3部分から構成されている。

序章では、分析方法や理論枠組みを特定して論ずることなく、簡潔にアジア法研究と法整備支援の関係から本書の有用性を述べている。

全14章の各国法では、東アジア、東南アジア、南アジアの順で、各国法の基本情報を提供している。

本書は、アジアの14カ国、すなわち、中国、韓国、台湾、モンゴル、インドネシア、ベトナム、カンボジア、タイ、マレーシア、ラオス、ミャンマー、イン
書

評

第2章 韓国

法史区分としては、①朝鮮時代以前、②朝鮮時代、③大韓帝国時代、④日本植民地時代、⑤韓国法の形成期、⑥韓国法の確立期、⑦韓国法の発展期。

韓国法の発展に影響を及ぼしたのは、①朝鮮時代以前の時代は、②朝鮮時代は、③大韓帝国時代は、④日本植民地時代は、⑤韓国法の形成期は、⑥韓国法の確立期は、⑦韓国法の発展期は、それぞれの時代特有の法制度を特徴としている。

第3章 台湾

法史区分としては、①日本時代の「特特に法制度」、②日本時代の「内地法制度延長時期」、③中華民国時代の「権威の統治法制度」、④自由民主の法制度、の4つに分けられる。台湾は、①日本時代の「特特に法制度」、②日本時代の「内地法制度延長時期」、③中華民国時代の「権威の統治法制度」、④自由民主の法制度、の4つに分けられる。

第4章 モンゴル

法史区分としては、①古代から清朝支配まで、②
ポグド・ハーン政権期。③ 人民政府期。④ 社会主義体制期。⑤ 民主化と市場経済化期。の5つに分けられる。特徴的なのは、ポグド・ハーン期（1911年頃～1917年頃）に新設された法律家、ジャムツァラーノの活躍である。彼は、キャリア会議で通訳として在籍し、モンゴル最初の定期雑誌や新聞を刊行し、西欧諸国の憲法制度にモンゴルを紹介した。後に法典編纂にも関与し、ソビエト連邦の介入に対して「権力が集中しすぎる」という反対意見を提出したことが話題を呼んだ。

現行の法システムは、西欧中心の法整備支援の影響もあり、日本法学者にとって把握が比較的容易なもの（一定程度日本法と類似性が認められるもの）であるが、土地所有に関して、原則として私有を認めなものの、牧地は私有化の対象となっているという制度も存在している。国際金融機関からの融資条件との相克から生まれた制度である。

第5章 インドネシア

本章ではインドネシア法関連情報へのアクセス情報が豊富である。インドネシア法は、インドネシア国家法、オランダ植民地法、イスラーム法、慣習法（アダット）からなる複雑なハイブリッド構造であることを紹介している。インドネシア司法は、ワンループシステムへ移行した記述があるものの（138ページ）、税務裁判所については統合は徹底していなさそうな点の記述が必要である。法制史や法整備支援についての説明は簡潔であり、参考文献への誘導の構成となっている。反対に、各研究情報ソースの説明が丁寧で、インドネシア語、オランダ語、英語、日本語による法情報検索の方法に意欲的に構成されている。現時点では、インドネシア法用語の日本語訳語が確定していないため原語を併記している。最近の法制問題として「慣習法の復活」を掲げ、この点は、Burns [2004] が要するインドネシア慣習法（アダット）も所詮は西洋法の思考枠組みの範疇に過ぎないと指摘したことと関連して考えると興味深い。

第6章 ベトナム

本章は特にベトナム憲法上の論点を提示し、全体として論文調である。2001年改正に伴う論点、すなわち、① 社会主義的法治国家の法的意義、② 社会主義的法制度概念と社会主義的法治国家の観念の融合ないし併存、③ ベトナム共産党機関の意思決定と法令の優劣、④ 民主集中原則と法の関係、⑤ 私的法の導入に伴う人権と市民の権利の承認、⑥ 立法権と憲法審査権の問題の適正性、⑦ 行政権における機関の権限配分、⑧ 市場経済化時代の司法権の役割、が検討されている。日本も強力に推し進めている法整備支援を第2の近代経験と位置づけ、中国起源といわれる「郷約」を当てて現代における機能を検討している。本章では、ダオ・チ・ウック教授といった、ベトナム法学者の持つさまざまな法分野における統治が最も新しいものであるという観念が強く、法はあくまでその人物による統治を補完するためのものであり必要である（181ページ）という考え方が顕著とされ、これは、「人間の支配」ととされる「法の支配」を掲げる法整備支援において直面する非常に根絶の難しい汚職の問題への貴重な示唆となっている。

第7章 カンボジア

本章では、2節を国家機関と法制度の概要説明に当てる。カンボジアは、ベトナムと並んで、相当大規模に日本の法整備支援の投入が行われている国であるので、法整備支援関連の説明が詳しい。併せて、クメール・ルージュ法改装の動向も法的な視点から検討が行われている。カンボジアではクメール・ルージュ政権下で法曹実務家と法学研究者のほとんどを含む大規模な内閣制の殺戮が行われ、1993年憲法に適当な法整備が極端に少ない世間によって、短期間に行われている実情が描かれている。法情報へのアクセス方法がほとんどで、無人操作した荒廃からの発展途上であることが読み取れる。

第8章 タイ

法史区分としては、① 開国以前のタイ法史、② 開国後のタイ法史の2区分としている。タイ法はその発展の経緯が日本に類似している点が多い。すなわち両国は、欧米列強の植民地化を免れつつ、不平等条
約を締結し、その後改正のために西欧法に基づく法整備を行った。20世紀前半のタイ法整備においては日本人専門家技師も活躍した。政体はイギリスに起源にあり、例えば法制度として一夫多妻制を認めるようにに対応した。この点、政体の帰国後、紆余曲折を経て、1935年に一夫一婦制の原則が採用され現在に至っている。本章では、タイ法研究における法律用語の説明選定の考えが論じられている。タイの訴訟システムに関しては、通常民事・刑事の他、破産、労働、税、知的財産、国際取引、少年、家族、簡易等裁判所が細かく専門化している。法曹三者とルクルトシステムはそれぞれ独立であるとしつつ、法曹会会員であることが要件でもあり法曹一元のエッセンスも有する。法情報へのアクセス方法については主に大学等の機関名を示すにとどまる。

第9章 マレーシア
法理区分としては、①イギリス社会以前、②イギリス植民地時代、の2区分され、独立前後から現行法への繋がりは本章全体から読み取る他ない。本章では、民族と宗教という切り口でマレーシア法を論じている。「マレーシアはコンローノ国（244ページ）」と断定する。この点、マレーシアとインドネシアは共に、マラヤ語を母体とした言語体系にあり、かつ、イスラム教を支配的な宗教としているところ、法体系については好対照となる。すなわちマレーシアは王制のこともロールとのハイブリッドであり、インドネシアは共和制かつ大陸法とのハイブリッドである。マレーシアでは原則として民族や宗教の違いに着目した独自法令が優先するもの、裁判官は実際にはイングランドの先例に従う傾向があるとされる（259ページ）。

マレーシア法は法整備支援団（ドナー）になりつつあるといい、ムスリム諸国では珍しく経済発展と相対的平和を享受した多民族国家としてモデルとなるのでと著者は示唆している。

第10章 ラオス
法理区分としては、①植民地以前の法、②フランス植民地期、③ラオス王国政府の司法制度、④現体制の成立から1991年憲法制定までの司法制度、⑤1991年憲法体制における司法制度、⑥2003年以降の司法制度改革の6つとされている。略述すると、仏教教義に基づいて実行を行った期間を経て、フランス法の影響を受けた制度運用時期があったものの、1975年から1976年に成立した革命政府によって裁判所は廃止され行政命令と調停によって法的紛争を処理してきた後、司法制度を再構築したという経緯がある。

ブランクとゲスロフはラオスの共産主義者を、「見習いの革命家たち」と表現し、ラオスの法制度はアジアの研究者によってペトナムの影響を強く受けていると指摘されてきた（268ページ）。しかし、2003年以降の司法改革においては、ペトナムで堅持されている監督審を廃止する一方、経済紛争解決センターや村紛争調停組織の運用などADR（代替的紛争解決）の分野ではペトナムよりも積極的な制度運用が行われているようであり独自性を発揮しつつある。ラオス全土に92名の弁護士が存在するものの（278ページ）、当の司法関係機関が、法律で認められている弁護士の接見交通権を認めない場合があるなどその役割は理解されていない段階だという。

第11章 ミャンマー
本章では、ミャンマー法が、古代インドの「マヌ法典」に起源を持ち、仏教と融合した傳統法を発展させた後、イギリス植民地として英法の影響を受けつつ、日本による占領を経験し、三権分立を否定する、反共的自由主義法体制を経て、国軍による政権奪取により正式な立法機関が存在しないまま制憲会を設置して2010年施行予定の憲法草案の国民投票実施に至った様子が描かれている。ミャンマーはイギリス植民地としての経験を持っているが、裁判所における法適用場面では、「ビルマ法典」を中心とした制定法や、家族法分野では「ダマッ」と呼ばれる慣習法が採用されるという。その極端な限界性から、法情報に関する資料の入手が非常に困難であるとされ、日本でのミャンマー法研究は、「伝統法分野を除いてほぼ皆無に近い」という（303ページ）。

第12章 インド
本章では、1947年以降のインド憲法と司法制度の
変遷を中心にインド法の解説を試みている。インド法ではコモノローの伝統で判例が重要な法源であることから、本書ではいくつかの重要判決をとりあげて解説を加えている。中でもクリシュナ・アイヤール最高裁判事が、労働者個人ではなく、労働組合に対して訴訟主体性を認め、当事者適格の要件緩和を行った判決などはインドにおける司法積極主義を示す好例となっている。インド司法の課題の一つに訴訟の滞留が挙げられ、2007年時点で最高裁で4万7千件（330ページ）が係属しているという。この解決のためにロク・アダート（民衆法廷）における和解手続などADR（代替的紛争解決）の活用も模索されている。インドでは、英米法諸国機関との共通で自国の法制度改革を行っている他、南アフリカへ整備支援を行っている。インドは他のアジア諸国と比較して法情報が豊富で特にウェブサイトが充実しているといえる。

第13章 パキスタン

本書全体がもとく英領インドからの独立国であるインドとの比較において論じられ、簡潔な解説となっている。独立後、国と軍政を政変に繋がりってきた歴史を有するので司法の独立がインドと比べて弱い、イスラム教が国教とされ、歴代の最高裁判事は全員男性であり、シャリーア裁判所系統も特設されている。法情報へのアクセスが相当困難であり研究領域としては特徴が現れていない。

第14章 バングラデシュ

本書ではパキスタンから独立したバングラデシュが約90%のイスラム人口を有しながらも「コモノロー系の国である（368ページ）」と断定し、①ナショナリズム、②民主制、③社会主義、④非宗教主義、の国家政策の基本原則を示して憲法以下のが効力の関係について詳しく説明する。1971年建国の比較的新しい国でありながら14次府憲法改正を経ており、各改正の論点を紹介している。法研究情報へのアクセス方法の提示は限定的である。

本書の特徴およびアジア法研究における位置づけ

本書の特徴としては、各論に激れているという点が挙げられる。

序章で8ページ、全14章の各国紹介で375ページ、付録に43ページを振り分けている。これに対し、安田（1996; 2000）では、まずアジア法研究の理論枠組みについて全体の約10分の1を割り、その後余を各国法紹介にあてている。また北村（2004）は、本书と同様に外国法各論に発したものであり、本書で述べられている諸国のおかずれからのアジア諸国の法を紹介している。この北村（2004）で「東南アジア法ほか」の部分の執筆陣全員が本書で執筆している。したがって、本書は、北村（2004）の「東南アジア法ほか」の部分をアップデート・充実させたものと捉えることができる。安田・孝忠（2006）がアジア法研究の理論部分を中心に論じていることから、これと併せて、安田（1996; 2000）の後藤の書を形成していると位置づけることもできる。このような位置づけであるが、本書を控えめに「ガイドブック」と命名したのかかもしれない。

また、アジア法を言語圏や宗教圏から論じたのに千葉（1988）があり、経済活動からの視点を中心に論じたものに金子（1998）がある。アジア諸国への法整備支援の理論化とケーススタディ紹介を試みたものとして金子・香川（2007）がある。

課題及び示唆

- 比較可能性の低さ

全体として統一性が不十分で、したがって、紹介されている諸国間の比較可能性が低いままになっている。例えば、統治・司法機関図がある章とない章との比重が現象し、あと一足足りなさがある。用語・文体について、第8章のタイ法で記述されているミャンマーのアナウンバーバー王朝（218ページ）は、コンバウン王朝（294ページ）と同一のものであるが、一見して分からない。本書は初学者も対象にしているのでいかえだろうか。また、章によって、細かく項目立てているものと、論文調のものとが混在している。要するに各行一つ一つをとれば、玉音といって差し支えないと、粒が揃っていない

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嫌いがある。

・法整備支援
本書の編者は日本の法整備支援の第一人者であり、「法整備支援に取り組む日本側の人物育成が重要な課題になっている」という（鈴木[2010]）。そう
だからすれば、法整備支援を必ず登り段節は設けるように調整すべきではないか。またそうすること
によって、北村[2004]等からの脱皮が明示され、オリジナリティが出せたと思われる。

・検討するアジア諸国法の数
バランギ正義等の特徴を有するフィリピン法、
安田[2000]ではとりあげられているシンガポール
法やブルネイ法。昨今の法整備支援トレンドの観点
からはネパール法などの略述または参考文献の紹介
を望むことは読者の欲求だろうか。

・著名な現地法律家・法学者の紹介
法律家は建国、政治史に大きな影響を与えている
場合が多い。また優れた法研究を残し、または法研究
ネットワーク形成に適切な現地研究者も存在
しているであろう。インドネシアで言えば、スボモ、サ
ヘタビ、ヒクマハント等が挙げられる。このような
人物をエピソードを交えて紹介することは、導入と
としても法情報アクセスの点からも有用であると思わ
れ、全章に記述があるとありがたい。

・アジア広域法研究へ向けた野心的取り組みへの活
用
本書は、上述の通り、各論に偏したものが、アジア
広域法としてのアジア法を考えるための有益な
材料を提供していることは間違いない。ただ、本書
の各章の共通項をたとえば一定力に賜る単一のアジア
広域法概念に行き着くと考えるのは早計であろう。
しかし、本書の各節のエッセンスを比較検討し、アジア
諸国の共通の指標にできそう、植民地経験、
経済体制、宗教、言語を、①英国影響か否か、②社会主
義経済か否か、③イスラームか否か、④漢語文化圏
か否か、といった軸に構築し、グループ分けを試み
てはどうだろうか。このような中間項を経ればある
いはアジア広域法の姿が見えてくるかも知れな
い。そうだとすれば本書は西欧法との並立比較ひ
っては、地球的統治法の検討にいたる、比較法研究の
発展に資することになるのではないか。さらには、
このような中間項を決定法整備支援におけるドナー
グループの機能的分類に有効と思われる。本書は読
者にとって様々な活用の仕方が考えられ、本邦にお
けるアジア諸国・広域法研究者及び法整備支援関係
者の道標となるものである。
（身玉山 三郎三（旧姓：河田）・熊戸大学大学院国
際協力研究科）

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1) 松尾[2010:9]など。