Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia is an important new contribution to the literature on piracy in Asian seas. As the title suggests, the authors were looking to go beyond an examination of piracy wholly on its own, and sought instead to link predation on the high seas to the maritime littoral in general, and to sea-based cities in particular, in their analysis. The thirteen chapters in the book are united in keeping the focus of attention on sea-strand relations, and one never seems to be too far from the other in the three hundred pages that make up this book. This in itself is an innovation of sorts, as many earlier attempts to deal with piracy in Asia have dwelt too much on the high seas and not enough (perhaps) on the coasts that supply people, ships, and material to make piracy possible in the adjacent waterways. Kleinan and Osseweijer likely had a discussion with their authors ahead of time on this theme, and the book holds together nicely in that the authors seem to have taken this duality seriously, each in their own work. We don’t see much of the sea here without feeling a breeze from land, too, and this is important overall.

The book is organized into three asymmetrical parts. In Part I, consisting of an introductory essay by the authors and a useful article by Michael Pearson on the definition of piracy in Asian waters, some of the main lines of the volume are laid out. Kleinan and Osseweijer lay out the circumstances of the construction of the book, which had its origins in a conference in Shanghai in 2005. They talk a bit about the social-scientific directions of the book, before providing summaries of the essays in the volume themselves, each of which is described in more or less a paragraph of text. Pearson’s initial essay complements this overview of the book by getting at some of the definitions of piracy in these waters going back to Early Modern times. His contribution is useful in that it situates the bulk of the study to come with some conceptual questions which are then explored in the book. It might have been useful here to have asked a third, non-Asia-focused specialist to weigh in on how piracy in Asia might differ from versions of this activity elsewhere in the world (off the Horn of Africa, perhaps, or in the Caribbean, two other hot-spots of global piracy). I could not help wondering if someone like Markus Reddiker, for example, whose books on piracy and sea-board life in the Atlantic, might not have had something useful to say about these articles as a collective, even if his own expertise is derived from analogous activities on the other side of the world.

Part II then delves into the history of piracy in East Asia in four essays. Robert Antony starts out nicely by looking at a maritime border-town between China and Vietnam (Giang Binh, in the Ta-son era around the turn of the nineteenth century), before Hoang Anh Tuan provides an exegesis (somewhat derived from his excellent book Silk for Silver: Dutch-Vietnamese Relations) on Tonkin’s role in the piratical and trade currents of the seventeenth century. Two other essays, by Paola Calanca and John Kleinan, then square the narrative more centrally on East Asian seas, as they examine the coasts of Fujian and the story of a single ship (the S. S. Nama, pirated off the coast of Guangdong in 1890), respectively. These are all interesting essays, filled with a wealth of primary-source detail (and some very good broader theoretical musings by Kleinan in particular), but it seems slightly “off” to call this section “East Asia.” Fully half of the narrative here takes place in Vietnamese waters, which may indeed be a maritime frontier zone of sorts between East and Southeast Asia but which seems slightly ghettoized by placement into only one of these designations here. This organizing rubric for the book might have been usefully deconstructed a bit further, with perhaps a different reference point rather than “East” and “Southeast” Asia serving to bundle the assembled essays. The sea, after all (and obviously) is fluid — such land-based monikers seem
Part III, the last section of the book, then brings up the rear with fully seven essays on “Southeast Asia.” All of this literature concentrates on the island world of Southeast Asia, and there is almost nothing here on the long outstretched coasts of Burma, Siam, and Cambodia, for example, and also little on the Malay Peninsula. This is a lacuna which should have been filled, likely, so the book might have had better balance. While it’s true that there is less literature on these coasts, and that piracy may have been practiced less here, too, than in the Insular world of Southeast Asia, this lack of material gives the book a feeling of slightly skewed orientation. I should be clear that the essays that are indeed here are very good ones; these are the main authors in the field, and the work that they exhibit here is nuanced and complex. Adri Lapian talks about piracy in Indonesian waters generally in his piece, and then Gerrit Knaap, Esther Velthoen, and Carolin Liss all discuss variations of piracy across several time periods in Papua, Sulawesi, and Sabah respectively. All are accomplished essays, which provide a very good balance between hard data and conception on the how’s and why’s of piracy working in these far-flung locales. Three other essays then problematize these ideas even further; as James Warren, Stefan Eklof Amirell, and Ikuya Tokoro all examine different avatars of the subject in one place, the Sulu Basin at the southern end of the Philippines. These essays too are accomplished, each and every one, with much that is new on display, as the Sulu Sea is dissected vis-à-vis its maritime dynamics from colonial to post-colonial to “ethnographic” time, and across the centuries. It is very helpful to these three essays together here, in fact, because one can see how various methodologies can be used to describe the same place, and how piracy looks different according to the tools being used in one’s own study.

Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia is a good book, and more than this it is a useful compendium which repays a serious reading and careful consideration of its contents. Many of the world’s academic experts on Asian piracy, both historical and contemporary, are on view here, and these are all serious scholars who have thought about these issues for a long time (and in some cases, for a very long time, including pioneers of the field in Warren and Lapian’s cases). The book is however slightly uneven, as I have described above, with perhaps too much attention paid to Insular Southeast Asia, and too little paid to Japanese and Korean waters (where are the wako, for example?), and the long outstretched coasts of the Southeast Asian mainland. Presumably to fit into the book’s title, some attention should have been paid to Indian Ocean piracy as well, of which there was plenty, and which still (of course) exists even now, though on a smaller scale than in previous centuries. I would recommend this book to anyone who wants to see strong, solid scholarship on the notion of piracy in Asian waters, and a number of the essays really do fit very well together in sets (on Sulu; on the Outer Islands of Indonesia; and on the Sino-Vietnamese frontier, for example). The book — already useful — might have been still stronger, however, had it aimed a bit more for geographic inclusion in its contributions, so that more territory could have been covered. This would make an already-utilitarian volume, impressive in many ways in its own right, even more of a contribution to a field that only seems to be growing year after year.

(Eric Tagliacozzo · Cornell University)
political problem that stems from the fact that the Malay-Muslim population has never accepted the legitimacy—the moral right to rule—of the Bangkok-based Buddhist-majority state.

Specifically, McCargo analyzes the illegitimacy of the Thai state from three angles: religion, politics, and security. First, he argues that the state has made conscious efforts to neutralize or fragment the authority of local Islamic leaders. These leaders, who are supposed to champion Malay-Muslims' interests, have been coopted into the state in return for material inducements. At the same time, traditional Islamic schools (bondok) have been placed under the control of the state in exchange for government subsidies. Consequently, ordinary Malay-Muslims have lost the “moral and spiritual center” in their communities (p. 52). Second, the Thai state has made similar moves to “coopt and control” the local Malay-Muslim political elites (p. 183). Several elites, such as Den Tohmeena and Wan Muhammad Nor Matha, have attained key cabinet positions since the 1980s, but this is, according to McCargo, a cosmetic measure taken by the state to appease the otherwise discontented Malay-Muslim population. Far from serving as vital links between the local and the center, those politicians have spent most of their time in Bangkok or have enriched themselves by collaborating with Bangkok-based political elites. As a result, the political (as well as religious) authority in Malay-Muslim communities has been weakened and divided by the state. Finally, Thai security forces have consistently displayed “a lamentable catalogue of criminal blunders, negligence, incompetence, lack of coordination, and sheer misdirection” (p. 133), as exemplified by the tragedies of Kru-Ze and Tak Bai. The post-Thaksin military-led government apologized for the past atrocities and repression, but failed to bring the security personnel involved to justice.

Under these circumstances that render the central state illegitimate, militant leaders, such as Ustadz Soh, have found ample room for maneuver in exploiting the Malay-Muslims’ pent-up anti-state grievances for their political ends. Here McCargo provides an important insight that Islam itself is not the cause of violent conflicts; rather, Islam constitutes a convenient rhetorical resource that a handful of hatemongering militant leaders have tapped or manipulated to mobilize local youths behind their violent cause. McCargo bases all these arguments on a wealth of previously untapped materials (e.g., militants’ confessions, leaflets circulated by militants, numerous interviews). This book makes a valuable contribution to the existing literature that only scratches the surface of the violent conflict in southern Thailand.

With this contribution duly acknowledged, however, the book leaves several things to be desired. First, McCargo’s explanation lacks sufficient historical depth, focusing preponderantly on the Thaksin era, especially on the period after January 2004. This temporal focus is puzzling, given McCargo’s contention that the conflict has deep roots in “historical and political grievances” (p. 188, emphasis mine). He bases his whole argument on the assumption that the Thai state’s rule over the Malay-Muslim provinces “has long lacked legitimacy” (p. 183), but this assumption is asserted, rather than well demonstrated through a longitudinal analysis of various events, state policies, and politicians (both national- and local-level) that have been involved in the region over the century. Characteristic of McCargo’s ahistorical analysis is his cursory discussion of the Prem Tinsulanond’s administration (1980–88). Prem, according to McCargo, only offered conciliatory policies without granting Malay-Muslims full participatory rule. The “carrot” helped contain the insurgency, but local discontent kept simmering underneath the surface, which erupted in violence after Thaksin attained power. The reader is not told how ordinary Muslims perceived Prem’s various policies (e.g., the “New Hope” initiative taken in the 1980s to develop the Malay-Muslim provinces) or how their negative views of the state were stoked and sustained by local-level political or religious elites. Another important neglected issue is the Bangkok-based prostitution rings that thrived in border areas—notably in Sungai Kolok of Narathiwat—in the 1980s–90s and proved highly unpopular with Malay-
Muslims for undermining the morality of their communities. Short on a deeply historical analysis of these (and other) issues, the book may give the false impression that Thaksin’s “regime” (as opposed to the “state” — McCargo tends to conflate the two concepts) is largely to blame for the upsurge in violence.

Contrary to its claims, the book also takes a rather simplistic view of state “legitimacy.” Every state enjoys varying degrees of legitimacy in different policy areas and at different points in time. In McCargo’s formulation, however, Malay-Muslims seem to have viewed the Thai state as illegitimate across board and across time. On issues of security, religious education, and political recruitment, the state may be illegitimate (as McCargo claims), but what about other schemes, such as social welfare, infrastructure development, and scholarships, from which a sizeable number of Malay-Muslims have benefited, albeit to varying degrees, over the years? These issues are not explored in the book.

The book, moreover, tends to make a jump from state illegitimacy to the occurrence and persistence of violent conflicts. According to McCargo, the militant movement has now found many active and passive sympathizers in the Malay-Muslim population. In some areas, they “constitute more than half or two-thirds of the population” (p.186). But it is unclear why these people support or condone the violent movement, given the fact that it has attacked innocent civilian Muslims in recent years. Seeing the state as illegitimate is one thing, but supporting the use of violence is another. If many Malay-Muslims view the state as illegitimate, they should view the violent movement as equally illegitimate. My educated guess (based on my brief stay in the three border provinces) is that most ordinary Malay-Muslims are willing, if not totally happy, to be part of the Thai nation-state. They remain neutral between the state and violent conflicts; they support neither side. They may oppose some types of “regimes” (e.g., Thaksin), but they do not necessarily shun the “state” altogether.

Finally, the book provides little theoretical and comparative analysis. What little theoretical discussion it provides draws primarily on Mohammed Hafez’s work without addressing the voluminous literature on insurgency and communal violence. How does the Thai case illuminate this literature? Similarly, McCargo unfortunately fails to cast the Thai case in comparative perspective. The existing literature, he laments, is “highly case specific” without offering “systematic comparative perspectives” (p.10). This critique can be turned against him, too. Is the Thai case similar to, or different from, other cases of insurgency movements or communal conflicts in countries like India, Indonesia, and the Philippines? It is a pity that he does not address these cases, for he presents an unparalleled amount of empirical materials.

These comments notwithstanding, McCargo has produced just another “must” book for anybody interested in Thai politics. The way he situates the violent conflicts in the nature of interaction between the center and periphery is particularly illuminating. This book sets the bar high for those currently working on the important topic of Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand.

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本書は全4部17章と「むすび」から成る。第1部は序論、第2部から第4部までが三つのトピックを扱った本体である。ここでは、各部の概要をまとめてゆこう。

序論では著者の問題意識と狙いが示される。いわく、インドネシアに限らず従来の華人研究では、華人が華人としての何らかの核（儒教精神や家族主義、関係guanxiや信用xinyongなど）や、中華文明を担うものとしてのアイデンティティを「あらかじめ」持っているかのような本質主義的議論が横行してきた。ある人が「華人であること」の論拠として抽象的に語られる「華人性」とは何か、それ自体に「常に／すでに」存在するものなのか？かかる問いから出発する著者が、「華人性」を抽象的にではなく、個別具体的に捉えることに意欲すると宣言する（p.2-3）。およそ400世代から成るルパンの「華人コミュニティ」を足に、「当人らが「華人」であるための核、ないしアイデンティティの拠り所となるような「華人性」をあらかじめ規定するのではなく、逆に「華人性」なるものがそれら人々の生活の場で立ち現れ、また意識化されていく過程を微細に描き出すことが肝要である（p.5）。またそのように「諸々の文脈を丁寧に追っていくことで、現象としての『華人性』を取り巻く様々な社会関係や制度をも照らし返していくことができる」（同）というのが著者の見通しである。

第2部では、ルパンにある二つの寺廟、慈恵宮と福徳廟の法的的地位をめぐって生じた事象がとりあげられる。スハルト体制期、「同化政策」下に置かれた華人は宗教の領域でも会場の「中国しさ」を表現することが著しく制限された。他方では全ての国民が国家公認宗教（イスラム、カトリック、プロテスタント、ヒンドゥー、仏教）の一つを奉じることが求められた。この結果、インドネシア各地の中国式寺廟（クリテン）の多くは、公認宗教の一つである仏教の下に加えられることにより、安定的な地位の保全を図ることが大勢だった。ところが、ルパンの二本寺廟は1995年、それまでの「仏教施設」としての地位を捨て、あって「中国の伝統的慣習に基づく施設」となるクリテンを名乗るようになる。スハルト体制期には異例といえるこの地位変更がなぜどのように起きただのか、著者は関係する人々の様々な思惑や社会的関係、「仏教施設」化ゆえに生じた軋轢とその解決のための合議・交渉過程を詳細に調べ、彼らがあえて寺廟の「華人性」を主張するようになった歴史を明らかにしてゆく。同時に、ルパンの華人たちがスハルト体制下の対華人政策や宗教政策への対応を繰り返す中、町の「華人コミュニティ」のまとまりが具体的に「寺廟を支える人々の集まり」として近似的に意識化されていったさまを描く。

第3部では、スハルト体制崩壊前夜、全国的に広がった反華人暴動の波がルパン周辺にも及びでくる中、「犯される者＝華人」としての自覚を否応なく迫られた華人商店主たちが、水面下で独自の自衛組織を作りあげてゆく過程を追う。このインフォーマルな「影の組織」が、やがてルパンの「華人コミュニティ」全体を包摂するものへと一元化されてゆくのみならず、近隣の町々の華人たちとの連絡体制を模索してゆく中で、広域的なネットワークが構築されるさま、さらに情勢の安定に伴い、『影の組織』やネットワークが消滅するまでが丹念に跡付けられる。その企図は日常的な対面関係の連なりを一歩も二歩も超えるような関係性の成立と破綻という一連の過程を見ていくこと（p.58）であり、それを通じて読者は著者が共有し「改めて目指しこの地方小都市に暮らす華人たちが抱いているコミュニティの」あり方、そしてその想像世界の広がりを具体的に捉え返していく（同）ことになる。

第4部では、ポスト・スハルト期、首都を中心にして結成された全国規模の華人団体主導のもと、華人やジャワ人やスンダ人と同様この国を構成する重要なエスニック集団の一つであることを主張する動きの一環として、ルパンや近郊の町ラセムの寺廟で祀られていた18世紀半ばの対オランダ反乱の伝説的指導者、陳貴姓を持つ両人物（以下、神格化された名である陳黄武先生）を、インドネシア政府の認定する「華人史」（国家英雄）に推挙する試みの顕著な法を追究される。陳黄武先生に関する民間伝承史料の「再発見」、その史料がジャカルタの華人団体関係者や地元の華人有力者等の手を経る中で、陳黃武先生こそ「華人対ブリブ
ミ」や「華人対ムスリム」という二項的対立を乗り越える理想的人物とみなさざるを得なくなります。さらにはインドネシア華人全体の地元に根ざしたこの「華人」あるいは国家英雄の意匠が中央と地方のやり取りの中でいかなる結末をとったかが語られる。本件を通じ浮かび上がるのは、体制転換直後のインドネシアで「華人」が高らかに主張される一貫情勢の中で、「その主張の母体となる華人の広がりというものがどのように捉えられているのか、中央華人団体、地元地元有力者とそれを取り巻く一般の生活者それぞれの間にある感情の違い」(p.59-60)である。

以上のように僅かに数字で要約することにためらいと困難を感じるのは、本書は内容豊かなる民族誌である。当初の目的であった「華人性」が人々の生活の場で立ち現れ、また意識化されていく過程を微細に描き出すこと、および「華人性」を取り扱う様々な社会関係や言葉をも照らして見ることは十分に達成されている。標題にも表れている通り、本書は第一義的に「華人性」の民族誌的記述を目指したものだが、その「華人性」の立ち現れの描写を通じ、元々は分析の足場として仮想定された「華人コミュニティ」の動態的な諸相を把握・記述することにも、結果的に成功していると思う。

その成功因はいつも考えられるが、何より「華人性」の表れや取り扱われ方を何らかの出来事、つまり「事件」の中に見出した手法にあるだろう。三つの事件はいずれもジャカルタを中心にした政治史からは見えてこない。しかしローカルな現場の華人たちにとっては一大事の出来事である。私事ながら著者は華人にやや先立つハルト体制末期、同じ中部ジャワのスマラン市で、著者と全く関係のない社会における「華人性」の表れ方を把握することを目指して調査をした経験がある。だが、人々と日常の時空間を共にすればするほど、彼らの「華人性」は自明のことを感じられるようになった。本書はさまざまな言語を組み立てて、は至らなかった。日常と非日常の臨界面に生じる「事件」に際してこそ、華人社会の内部で「華人性」（より一般的にはエスニシティ）をめぐる応酬が露わとなり、ひいては観察・記述可能になることを本書に伝えられた。

良く読めばわかるように、取りあげられた三つの事件のうち、最初の二つは著者がフィールドに入ると数年前に起こった出来事である。そのことを忘れてしまうほど、いずれも意味ある方向に展開する事件の記述は臨場感にあふれている。一見細密とさえ思える事柄に潜んだ問題の広がりを直感し掘り下げていた聴覚（特に第2節）、反華人暴動の生々しいディテールや微妙な人間関係、裏金の流れなど相当センシティブな事柄まで人々に胸襟を開いて語られた信頼関係の醸成（特に第3節）、多層的・多面的な「歴史」の生成についての深い洞察（特に第4節）などの動物であろう。著者にとってこれが初めての本格的なフィールドワークであったことを思い返す「天賦の才」を感じさせるが、人々とやりとりを重ねる中でここという勘所を捉え、時間をかけてじっくりよく読み取りを行なった努力が迫るところ。僅かの余裕で、「華人性」をめぐって展開する豊かな事象を再構成し、「読むで面白い」物語にまで仕立て上げた表現力（演出に富んだ構成力、論理的で正確な文章力）にも感嘆する。評者はまた本書の成る数年前から著者の웅로を読む機会に恵まれたが、人類学でいう「分厚い記述」とはこのことか、と説明するばかりだった。その後補足調査を重ね、満を持して刊行された本書では、「分厚い」という唐突な感があり、かつ論点が無駄なく整理し直され、読みやすくなっている。

本書は傑作であるだけに、惜しまれる点がないわけではない。一つは、中心問題である「華人性」の定義がやや曖昧なことである。私見では、「華人性」（ひいてはエスニシティ一般）には、ある人が「華人である」という帰属性と、華人という集団カテゴリーに付与される特性（ステレオタイプを含む）の少なくとも3つ次の次元があると思われる。本書ではそれが明確に区別されぬままこの言葉が使われているくらいがある。また、考察の出発点となる問題意識の説明箇所で著者の指摘するほど、近年の華人研究においてなお本質主義的議論が横行していると言えるか、少し疑問を感じた。インドネシア人自身によるインドネシア華人研究
に限っても、Hamzah編著書〔1998〕やWibowo編著書〔1999; 2000〕に収められだったいくつかの論考やHeryanto〔1998〕などは、ニュアンスの違いはあれ、構築主義的な立場から「華人性」を捉えようとしている。序論では、これ「本質主義的ではない」諸研究の達成した地平と本書との関係も語って欲しかった。もう一つ、参与観察・聴き取り調査の対象や故事の重心が寺廟に集まる中高年層に置かれ、ルンバパン華人コミュニティの相当部分（p.269の註18によれば65.8％）を占めるキリスト教徒、特にプロテスタント信徒（同29.5％）や若年層の記述が薄い。後者の人々にとっての「華人性」がいかなるものなのか、今後探究されるべき課題の一つに挙げられるだろう。

いずれにせよ本書は、骨太にして緻密な、完成度の高い作品である。このような世界的にも水準の高い華人研究がわが国の東南アジア学界から生みだされたことは喜ばしい。単に華僑華人研究者のみならず、インドネシア、東南アジア社会、あるいはエスニシティやマイノリティの問題に関心のある読者に広く深く読まれる価値がある。

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言及文献


